Limitations of the Deductibility of Intra-Group Interest Payments - The Swedish Legislation and its Compatibility with the Freedom of Establishment by Ljungberg, Anna
 
 
FACULTY OF LAW 
University of Lund 
 
 
 
Anna Ljungberg 
 
 
Limitations of the Deductibility of 
Intra-Group Interest Payments 
 
The Swedish Legislation and its Compatibility  
with the Freedom of Establishment 
 
 
 
Master thesis 
30 credits 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor:  
Christina Moëll 
 
 
International Tax Law 
 
 
Autumn 2009 
Contents 
SUMMARY 1 
SAMMANFATTNING 2 
ABBREVIATIONS 3 
1 INTRODUCTION 4 
1.1 Problem background 4 
1.2 Purpose and question formulation 5 
1.3 Method and material 6 
1.4 Delimitations 6 
1.5 Terminology 8 
1.6 Outline 8 
2 TAX PLANNING PRACTICES WITH INTEREST 
DEDUCTIONS 10 
2.1 The basic principles 10 
2.2 Practical examples 11 
2.3 Legal framework conditions 13 
3 LIMITATIONS OF THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF INTRA-GROUP 
INTEREST PAYMENTS 14 
3.1 Overview 14 
3.2 Affiliated companies 14 
3.3 Principal rules 15 
3.4 Complementary rules 15 
3.4.1 The “ten percent”-rule 16 
3.4.2 Principally business motivated transactions 17 
3.5 Burden of proof 19 
4 EU LAW IN THE FIELD OF DIRECT TAXATION 20 
4.1 Overview 20 
4.2 The Treaty and national tax law 20 
4.2.1 Article 115 TFEU 20 
4.2.2 The impact of Court decisions 21 
5 THE FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT 23 
5.1 Overview 23 
5.2 Articles 49 and 54 TFEU 23 
5.2.1 The rights conferred on legal persons 24 
5.2.2 Definition of establishment 26 
5.2.3 Direct effect 27 
6 LIMITATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT 28 
6.1 Overview 28 
6.2 The non-discrimination approach 28 
6.2.1 Defintion of discrimination 28 
6.2.2 Objectively comparable situations 30 
6.3 The non-restriction approach 31 
7 THE SWEDISH RULES AND POSSIBLE LIMITING EFFECTS 
ON THE FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT 32 
7.1 Overview 32 
7.2 Approaching the problem 32 
7.2.1 The Swedish legislation at issue 33 
7.3 Relevant case law of the Court of Justice 34 
7.3.1 C-374/04 ACT Group Litigation 34 
7.3.2 C-282/07 Truck Center 35 
7.3.3 C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst 36 
7.3.4 C-524/04 Thin Cap Group Litigation 37 
7.4 Aspects of EU law in the preparatory work 38 
7.5 Swedish case law of relevance 39 
7.5.1 The Council for Advance Tax Rulings 39 
7.5.1.1 Divergent opinions 40 
7.6 Analysis 40 
7.6.1 The first line of reasoning; not objectively comparable 
situations 40 
7.6.1.1 Distinguishing the ACT Group Litigation case 41 
7.6.1.2 Distinguishing the Truck Center case 43 
7.6.2 The second line of reasoning; objectively comparable situations 
are at hand 44 
7.7 Conclusion 46 
8 GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION 47 
8.1 Overview 47 
8.2 Justification grounds in the Treaty 47 
8.3 The rule-of-reason doctrine 47 
8.3.1 Effectiveness of fiscal control 48 
8.3.2 The principle of territoriality 49 
8.3.3 Fiscal coherence 50 
8.3.4 Balanced allocation of taxing power 51 
8.3.5 Prevention of abuse 51 
9 THE SWEDISH RULES AND POSSIBLE GROUNDS OF 
JUSTIFICATION 53 
9.1 Overview 53 
9.2 Approaching the problem 53 
9.2.1 Possible grounds of justification applicable in the present case 54 
9.3 Relevant case law of the Court of Justice on abuse 55 
9.3.1 C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst 55 
9.3.2 C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes 56 
9.3.3 C-524/04 Thin Cap Group Litigation 57 
9.4 The Commission’s Communication on anti-abuse measures 58 
9.5 Aspects of EU law in the preparatory work 59 
9.6 The Council for Advance Tax Rulings 59 
9.7 Analysis 60 
9.8 Conclusion 63 
REFERENCES 65 
TABLE OF CASES 70 
 
 1
Summary 
On January 1, 2009, new rules regarding limitations of the deductibility of 
intra-group interest payments came into force in the Swedish legislation. 
The rules aim to prevent the use of certain tax planning practices, where a 
company appropriates itself tax advantages by taking advantage of the 
unlimited right to deduct interest expenses. The tax advantage is ensued 
when the paying company makes an interest deduction in Sweden whereas 
the corresponding interest income is taxed at a low tax-rate or not at all by 
the receiving company. 
 
The rules are, in the main, limiting the deductibility of interest payments 
attributable to intra-group loans obtained to finance an acquisition of shares 
from another company member of the same group. In order to not obstruct 
business-motivated transactions, two complementary rules has been 
introduced that exempts certain transactions from the purview of the 
principal rule. According to those rules, interest can still be deducted on 
condition that either the corresponding interest income is subject to tax at a 
minimum rate of ten percent at the level of the receiving company or the 
intra-group acquisition as well as the internal loan is principally business-
motivated. The expression principally business-motivated implies that the 
businesslike reasons have to amount to 75 percent. 
 
The rules apply to all companies that are resident in Sweden and members 
of a group of companies. The majority of interest paid by a subsidiary to an 
parent company, which are both resident in Sweden, will be deductible, 
since the corresponding interest income is normally subject to tax at a rate 
exceeding that of ten percent. As regards interest paid to a parent company 
resident in a state other than Sweden, it is not the matter of course that the 
corresponding interest income will be subjected to such taxation.  
Accordingly, the effect is that subsidiaries to foreign parent companies to a 
larger extent are affected by the rules than in case of resident parent 
companies.  
 
In the thesis, it argued that the difference in tax treatment caused by an 
application of the Swedish rules is contrary to EU law and the freedom of 
establishment in particular. Still, the rules can be justified by the need to 
prevent abuse on condition that they are only targeting wholly artificial 
arrangements entered into for tax purposes only. However, a requirement 
prescribing that the businesslike reasons have to amount to 75 percent goes 
beyond what is necessary, as business-motivated transactions will also be 
affected. This deficiency could be rectified by removing the word 
principally from the wording of the rule. The argumentation is based on the 
reasoning of the Court of Justice in the cases Lankhorst-Hohorst, Cadbury 
Schweppes and Thin Cap Group Litigation. 
Sammanfattning 
Den 1 januari 2009 trädde nya regler i kraft som begränsar rätten till avdrag 
för ränteutgifter för företag i intressegemenskap. Syftet med reglerna är att 
motverka ett särskilt skatteplaneringsförfarande, där ett företag utnyttjar den 
obegränsade rätten till avdrag för ränteutgifter för att tillskapa sig 
skatteförmåner. Skatteförmånen uppstår genom att den motsvarande 
ränteinkomsten beskattas lågt eller inte alls hos mottagaren.  
 
De nya reglerna avser i huvudsak att begränsa avdragsrätten för ränteutgifter 
hänförliga till koncerninterna lån upptagna i syfte att finansiera ett förvärv 
av en delägarrätt från ett annat företag inom samma koncern. För att inte 
affärsmässigt motiverade förfaranden ska träffas av reglerna har två 
kompletteringsregler införts, som undantar vissa förfaranden från 
huvudreglernas tillämpningsområde. Ränteavdrag får därför ändå göras dels 
då den inkomst som motsvarar ränteutgiften är föremål för beskattning om 
minst tio procent i den stat där det mottagande företag har sin hemvist och 
dels i de fall då såväl förvärvet som den skuld som ligger till grund för 
ränteutgifterna är huvudsakligen affärsmässigt motiverade. Uttrycket 
huvudsakligen affärsmässigt motiverad innebär att transaktionen ska präglas 
av affärsmässighet till 75 procent 
 
Reglerna är tillämpliga i förhållande till samtliga bolag med hemvist i 
Sverige som ingår i en intressegemenskap. Majoriteten av räntebetalningar 
som betalas erläggs av ett dotterbolag till ett moderbolag, som båda har 
hemvist i Sverige, kommer inte att omfattas av avdragsförbudet, eftersom 
den korresponderade ränteinkomsten normalt är föremål för beskattning 
överstigande tio procent hos moderbolaget. Vad gäller räntebetalningar till 
moderbolag med hemvist i en annan stat än Sverige är det inte på samma 
sätt självklart att dessa kommer att beskattas med en skattesats som 
överstiger tio procent. Reglerna får därför den effekten att avdragsförbudet 
drabbar dotterbolag med utländskt moderbolag i högre utsträckning än då 
moderbolaget svenskt.  
 
I uppsatsen argumenteras det för att regler som medför en sådan skillnad i 
den skattemässiga behandlingen som beskrivits ovan inte är förenlig med 
EU-rätten och den fria etableringsrätten i synnerhet. Emellertid torde 
reglerna kunna rättfärdigas med hänsyn till behovet att förhindra skatteflykt. 
En förutsättning för rättfärdigande är emellertid att reglerna endast träffar 
rent konstlade upplägg, vilka endast företagits i syfte att erhålla 
skattefördelar. Ett krav på att affärsmässigheten ska uppgå till 75 procent 
går dock utöver vad som är nödvändigt, då även transaktioner som är 
affärsmässiga till viss del kommer att träffas av reglerna. Denna brist kan 
emellertid åtgärdas genom att huvdsaklighetsrekvisitet avlägsnas ur 
lagtexten. Argumentationen är till stora delar baserad på det resonemang 
som förts av EU-domstolen i fallen Lankhorst-Hohorst, Cadbury Schweppes 
och Thin Cap Group Litigation. 
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Abbreviations 
AG Advocate General 
CFC Controlled Foreign Corporation 
CJ Court of Justice 
DTC Double Tax Convention 
EC European Community 
EEA European Economic Area 
e.g. exempli gratia; for example 
et al. et alii; and others 
et seq. et sequens; and the following one or ones 
EU European Union 
i.a. inter alia; among other things 
i.e. id est; that is 
p. page 
para. paragraph 
SEK Swedish Krona 
TEC the Treaty establishing the European Community; the EC 
Treaty 
TEU the Treaty on European Union; the EU Treaty  
TFEU the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
viz. videlicet; namely 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Problem background 
On January 1, 2009, new rules regarding limitations of the deductibility of 
intra-group interest payments came into force in the Swedish legislation. 
The rules aim to prevent the use of certain tax planning practices, where a 
company appropriates itself tax advantages by taking advantage of the 
unlimited right to deduct interest expenses. The tax advantage is ensued 
when the paying company makes an interest deduction in Sweden whereas 
the corresponding interest income is taxed at a low tax-rate or not at all by 
the receiving company. 
 
The Swedish Tax Agency1 initiated the adoption of the new rules by 
submitting a proposal2 to the Swedish government with suggestions for 
limiting interest deductions on intercompany loans. In the proposal, the 
Swedish Tax Agency stated that the tax planning practice at issue eroded the 
Swedish tax base and estimated the yearly tax revenue loss to several billion 
Swedish kronor (SEK). The Swedish Tax Agency had previously attempted 
to challenge these transactions by applying the Tax Avoidance Act.3 
However, the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court4 ruled that the Tax 
Avoidance Act did not apply in these situations.5 
 
The proposal of the Swedish Tax Agency was heavily criticised by the 
consultive bodies, mainly because the scope of the proposed rules was 
considered too wide. The consultive bodies feared that the rules would 
extend to a large number of intra-group loans, irrespectively of the purpose 
of obtaining those loans and irrespectively of whether a tax advantage had 
been appropriated to the taxpayer in question or not. Because of the heavy 
critic of the consultive bodies, the Swedish Ministry of Finance reviewed the 
Swedish Tax Agency’s proposal and in their presented memorandum,6 the 
scope of the rules was considerably narrowed. Most notably, two exception 
rules had been drawn up, precluding the application of the rules limiting the 
deductibility of interest payments in respect of intra-group loans fulfilling 
certain requirements. The exception rules were introduced in order to render 
possible ordinary intra-group financing, e.g. intra-group financing motivated 
by business reasons. After passing the consideration of the Council of 
Legislation7, the Swedish Government submitted a legislative proposal8, 
                                                 
1 In Swedish: “Skatteverket”. 
2 See Proposal of the Swedish Tax Agency regarding Limitations of the deductibility of 
interest payments on certain loans, issued 2008-06-23 (No 131-348803-08/113). 
3 In Swedish: ”Lag (1995:575) mot skatteflykt”. 
4 In Swedish: ”Regeringsrätten”. 
5 See RÅ 2001 ref. 79 and RÅ 2007 ref. 84-85. 
6 See Memorandum (Fi2008/4093) of the Swedish Ministry of Finance. 
7 In Swedish: ”Lagrådet.” 
8 See Government Bill 2008/09:65. 
 4
largely based on the Ministry of Finance’s memorandum, which, 
consequently, was accepted.  
 
Although revised, the rules regarding limitations of the deductibility of 
intra-group interest payments were –  and still are – subjected to critic by the 
consultive bodies as well as in the legal debate.9 The rules are feared to have 
restrictive effects on normal business activities and, as those restrictive 
effects affect interest paid by Swedish companies to foreign group members 
to a larger extent than interest paid to resident group members, it is argued 
that the rules do not comply with EU law and the freedom of establishment 
in particular. 
 
The freedom of establishment, set out in Article 49 TFEU, confers a right to 
all EU nationals to set up companies and therethrough carry on their 
business under the same conditions as nationals of the host state. According 
to Article 54 TFEU, the freedom of establishment also applies in relation to 
companies seated within the Union. Hence, the freedom of establishment 
implies an obligation on the Member States to grant national treatment of 
foreign persons and companies when in the position of host states. 
Furthermore, if in the position of home states, the Member State must 
refrain from applying legislation hindering its nationals from establishing 
themselves in another Member State. However, under certain circumstances 
recognised by EU law and on condition that the rules are proportionate, 
national legislation subjecting foreigners to special treatment may be 
justified. 
 
1.2 Purpose and question formulation 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine whether the regulations on 
limitations of the deductibility of intra-group interest payments in the 
Swedish legislation, set out in Chapter 24, Paragraphs 10a – 10d of the 
Swedish Income Tax Act, is compatible with EU law or, more specifically, 
the freedom of establishment as laid out in Articles 49 and 54 TFEU.   
 
In order to achieve this purpose, the following have to be answered: 
 
• Are the Swedish rules on limitations of the deductibility of intra-
group interest payments in breach of Articles 49 and 54 TFEU on 
the freedom of establishment?  
 
• If in breach, is there a valid ground of justification curing the 
breach? 
 
• If validly justified, are the rules proportionate? 
                                                 
9 See e.g. Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 69-72, Consideration of Svenskt Näringsliv 
regarding Fi2008/4093, issued 2008-09-29 and Hellenius. Richard, “De nya 
ränteavdragsbegränsningarna” in Svensk Skattetidning 2009/2, p. 161. 
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1.3 Method and material 
The method used will be a traditional legal dogmatic method. I will review 
and analyze relevant documents such as statutory acts together with their 
preparatory work as well as case law and legal writing. The paper will be 
based on both Swedish and EU sources of law.  
 
In approaching the subject, I will follow the examination pattern used by the 
Court of Justice when assessing whether a national measure is in breach of 
the free movement provisions.10 Accordingly, the first question examined is 
whether the Swedish rules are contrary to the freedom of establishment, i.e. 
whether the rules are discriminatory in their application or otherwise have 
restrictive effects on cross-border movements within the EU. If the rules are 
found to constitute a breach, I will move on to examine whether there are 
any possible grounds of justification applicable in the present situation. 
Finally, if the conclusion is that the rules can be justified, it has to be 
examined whether the rules are proportionate within the meaning of EU law.  
 
During the course of writing this thesis, the Treaty of Lisbon11 entered into 
force.12 The Treaty of Lisbon amends the two core treaties of the European 
Union, namely the Treaty on European Union13 and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community.14 The latter is renamed the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.15 However, there has been little change 
to the substantive law contained in the former Treaty. The free movement 
provisions,16 which are of particular interest to this thesis, have been 
renumbered but not subjected to any textual changes. Accordingly, cases 
and materials concerning these provisions, in context of the previous Treaty, 
are still relevant sources of law. 
 
1.4 Delimitations 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the compatibility of the Swedish 
rules on limitations of the deductibility of intra-group interest payments 
                                                 
10 For more on the Court’s examination pattern; see e.g. Hilling, Maria, “Free movement 
and Tax Treaties in the Internal Market”, Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 2005, p. 90 and 
Dahlberg, Mattias, “Direct Taxation in Relation to the Freedom of establishment and the 
Free Movement of Capital”, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 26. 
11 “Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing 
the European Community”, Official Journal of the European Union C 306/50, 17 December 
2007. 
12 Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009. 
13 “Treaty on the European Union”, Official Journal of the European Union, C 191, 29 July 
1992. 
14 “The Treaty establishing the European Community”, Official Journal of the European 
Union, C 325/40, 24 December 2002. 
15 See “Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union”, Official Journal of the European Union C 115 of 
9.05.2008. 
16 Articles 28-66 TFEU – The Free Movement of Goods, Persons, Services and Capital. 
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with Articles 49 and 54 TFEU on the freedom of establishment. 
Consequently, the thesis will only examine the compatibility of the rules in 
relation to primary law. Possible incompatibilities between the Swedish 
rules in question and secondary law therefore falls outside the scope of this 
study. Furthermore, the thesis will be limited to tax planning schemes 
involving only establishments within the EU/EEA area.17 
 
As mentioned in Paragraph 1.3, the subject will be approached in line with 
the examination pattern of the Court of Justice. However, as regards this 
thesis, one of the steps of the Court’s reasoning has been left out, namely 
the assessment of which of the free movement provisions that is applicable. 
The interest deduction limitations at issue in this thesis apply to intra-group 
interest payments, e.g. interest payments made to affiliated companies. 
According to the Swedish rules, two companies are affiliated if, firstly, 
either of them has, directly or indirectly, the deciding influence over the 
other company or, secondly, if the two companies are under principally the 
same management. In the Baars18 case, the Court of Justice declared that a 
national of a Member State, who has a holding in the capital of a company 
established in another Member State, which gives him definite influence 
over the company's decisions and allows him to determine its activities, is 
exercising his right of establishment.19  
 
Since the national rules at issue concern cross-border payments, one might 
argue that the free movement of capital provision in Article 63 TFEU might 
also be applicable. However, only one of the fundamental freedoms can apply 
in each case. According to case law of the Court of Justice,20 legislation such 
as the legislation at issue in this thesis, which targets only at relations within 
a group of companies, primarily affects the freedom of establishment. Since 
restrictive effects on the free movement of capital are only an unavoidable 
consequence of the restriction of establishment, an independent examination 
of the rules in relation to the free movement of capital is not necessary. 
However, the scope of the free movement of capital provisions are wider 
than the scope of the freedom of establishment provisions, which, in 
principle, does not confer any rights to companies established outside the 
EU/EEA area. As the thesis is limited to establishments within EU/EEA 
area, the Swedish rules at issue will be examined in relation to the freedom 
of establishment only. 
 
                                                 
17 However, in Paragraph 2.2 ”Practical examples” a tax planning scheme involving the 
United States is described. The example is included in the thesis for the purpose of illustrate 
the basic principles of intra-group tax planning with interest deduction only. 
18 C-251/98 Baars v Inspecteur der. Belastingen Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem 
[2000] ECR I-2787. 
19 C-251/98 Baars v Inspecteur der. Belastingen Particulieren/Ondernemingen Gorinchem 
[2000] ECR I-2787, para. 22. See also C-492/04 Lasertec [2007] ECR I-3775, para. 20. 
20 See e.g. C-36/02 Omega [2004] ECR I-9609, para. 27, C-452/04 Fidium Finanz [2006] 
ECR I-9521, para. 48 and C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2007] ECR I-2107, para. 34. 
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1.5 Terminology  
As regards this thesis, the expression host state refers to the Member State 
in which business is established. Discrimination or restrictions in the host 
state refers to the situation where the host state applies special treatment to 
foreign persons to the detriment of such persons. The expression 
discrimination or restrictions in the home state aims to describe the 
situation where the home state applies rules that will hinder or deter 
nationals or residents to establish themselves abroad. Furthermore, the 
expression outbound dividends refers to dividends paid by domestic 
companies to shareholders in other States, seen from a perspective of the 
state of residence of the paying company. Consequently, the expression 
inbound dividends refers to dividends paid by foreign companies to 
domestic shareholders. Domestic dividends are dividends paid by domestic 
companies to domestic shareholders. 
 
The entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty also has consequences for 
terminology. In particular, since the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Union 
now has legal personality in its own right and absorbs what used to be 
known as the European Community. Therefore, the European Union, the 
Union or the EU replaces all references to the Community and the term EU 
law is now used instead of EC law. However, the term Community will still 
be used in respect of historical references. The former European Court of 
Justice and Court of First Instance are renamed the Court of Justice and the 
General Court respectively. The Court of Justice of the European Union 
refers collectively to the Court of Justice, the General Court and any 
specialist Judicial Panels created.21  
 
As for the purposes of this thesis, the Court of Justice will, at times, solely 
be referred to as the Court. The term Treaty is used as a reference to the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
 
1.6 Outline 
The following chapter, Chapter 2, contains a description of the basic 
principles of tax planning practices with interest deductions. The purpose is 
to give the reader a basic understanding of how this type of tax planning is 
carried out and elucidates the legal framework conditions necessary to 
achieve the desired tax effects. In Chapter 3, the Swedish legislation 
regarding limitations of the deductibility of intra-group interest payments is 
described. Naturally, as they are the subject of examination, a description of 
the content and implications of these rules are essential in order to answer 
the propounded questions of this thesis.  
 
                                                 
21 Guidelines provided by the Directorate-General for Translation of the European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/translation/writing/style_guides/english/what's_new_style_guide_en.pdf
visited 2009-12-10. 
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Chapter 4 deals with the impact of EU law in the field of direct taxation. 
The chapter aims to provide the reader with a general comprehension on the 
subject, which is helpful in understanding the further discussion. In 
Chapter5, the purport of the freedom of establishment is described. Since 
the Swedish legislation on interest deduction limitations targets interest 
payments made by companies only, the chapter is focusing on the rights 
conferred to legal persons. Chapter 6 concentrates on limitations of the 
freedom of establishment and how the Court approaches the question of 
whether a national measure constitutes such a limitation.  
 
In Chapter 7, the first question of this thesis will be addressed, namely 
whether the Swedish rules at issue are in breach of the freedom of 
establishment. The chapter contains, in addition to the content of the 
previous chapters, cases and materials of relevance in order to provide an 
answer to this question. The chapter also provides an analysis based on the 
presented facts, leading to a conclusion of whether the Swedish rules are 
limiting the freedom of establishment. 
 
Chapter 8 contains a description of the different grounds of justification 
found in the Treaty and in the case law of the Court of Justice. In Chapter 9, 
the second and third question of this thesis will be examined, viz. whether 
the Swedish rules on interest deduction limitations can be justified and, if 
so, whether they meet the requirement of proportionality. The chapter 
contains cases and materials that, beside the information presented in the 
previous chapter, are pertinent to answer the propounded questions.  
 
Finally, Chapter 10 provides some conclusive remarks regarding the 
findings of this thesis. 
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2 Tax Planning Practices with 
Interest Deductions 
2.1 The basic principles 
The term tax planning practices with interest deductions aims to describe a 
variety of transactions, resulting in tax advantages due to interest deductions 
made within a group of companies. The transactions in question can be 
designed in a number of ways, although they display the common feature 
that while the paying company in Sweden is allowed to fully deduct interest 
expenses, the corresponding interest income is taxed at a low tax rate or not 
at all by the receiving company.22 In this chapter, the legislation regarding 
limitations of the deductibility of intra-group interest payments23 will be 
disregarded from, wherefore several of the tax planning practices described 
below no longer will give rise to the same tax effects. Figure 1.1 below 
aims to depict the basic principles of intra-group tax planning with interest 
deductions:24 
 
1. 
2a. 
 2b. 
 
Company B 
3. 
 
Company B 
 
New AB  
4.
 
Company A 
1.) Company A establishes a new 
Swedish share company, New AB. 
 
2a.) Company A transfers 
Company B, a wholly owned 
profit-making Swedish subsidiary, 
to New AB to market price. 
 
2b.) As remuneration, Company A 
receives an interest-bearing bond 
from New AB. The interest of the 
bond and other terms are market 
orientated.  
 
3.) Company B, now owned by 
New AB, is able to make a group 
contribution to New AB.  
 
4.) New AB pays interest to 
Company A. The interest payments 
are financed by the group 
contributions made by Company B 
to New AB. Figure 1. 
                                                 
22 Memorandum (Fi2008/4093) of the Swedish Ministry of Finance, p. 5. 
23 See Chapter 24, Paragraphs 10a – 10e of the Swedish Income Tax Act. 
24 The design of the figure is based on the description of an example of a so-called “interest 
spinner” outlined by the Swedish Tax Agency in their Proposal regarding Limitations of 
the deductibility of interest payments on certain loans, issued 2008-06-23 (No 131-348803-
08/113), p. 17. 
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Company A is typically a foreign company, resident in a low-tax 
jurisdiction. Consequently, the tax imposed on the interest payment received 
by Company A is low or non-existent.25 Company B is, according to 
Chapter 35 of the Swedish Income Tax Act, able to distribute its profit to its 
Swedish parent company, New AB, by making a group contribution. The 
received group contribution is included in the taxable income of New AB, 
but by making use of the unlimited right to deduct interest expenses, the 
received group contribution can be set off against the interest payments.26 
 
New AB is not, according to the Swedish Income Tax Act, able to make a 
group contribution to Company A, as it is required that the receiving 
company is liable to pay tax on the corresponding income in Sweden in 
order for New AB to be able to deduct the group contribution as a cost. Nor 
can New AB reduce its result by using transfer pricing, i.e. transferring 
underpriced assets or providing underpriced services to Company A, as 
those prices runs the risk of being adjusted by application of the correction 
rule in Chapter 14, Paragraph 19 of the Swedish Income Tax Act.27 
 
2.2 Practical examples 
Hence, an intra-group tax planning practice with interest deductions 
involves a distribution of the worked up profit of Company B, via New AB, 
to another intra-group company, the parent Company A, which for different 
reasons is subject to more favourable tax treatment than Company B. In the 
textbook example, the more favourable tax treatment is due to the fact that 
the company receiving the interest payments is located in a low-tax 
jurisdiction, many of them being so-called tax havens.28  
 
Another way, to achieve a more advantageous tax treatment using the 
interest deduction scheme, is to take advantage of diverse legislation of 
different countries. For instance, USA applies a set of classification rules, 
often referred to as Check-the-Box. These rules implies a possibility for a 
parent company resident in the US to make the choice of being liable to tax 
on the revenue of its subsidiaries by checking a certain box in its income tax 
return form. The parent and its subsidiary are then fiscally regarded as the 
same tax subject. This condition creates opportunities to obtain tax benefits, 
since a subsidiary resident in Sweden, which renders interest payments to its 
American parent company, are able to deduct these payments entirely in 
Sweden whereas the corresponding interest incomes received by the parent 
is regarded as a nullity and, hence, those incomes are not subject to tax in 
the US.29  
                                                 
25 Tivéus, Ulf. ”Räntebetalningar till utlandet på koncerninterna lån finansierade med 
koncernbidrag – skatteflykt?” in Skattenytt, 2007, p. 687. 
26 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 34. 
27www.skatteverket.se/skatter/skatteupplagg/rantesnurror.4.3dfca4f410f4fc63c8680009710.htlm 
visited 2009-11-11. 
28 Memorandum (Fi2008/4093) of the Swedish Ministry of Finance, p. 11. 
29 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 35. 
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Similar rules, where companies within a group, in respect of fiscal matters, 
are considered as a unified entity, exist in a number of different countries. 
As regards tax planning practices carried out by Swedish companies, the 
Dutch so-called fiscal unity-rules are one of to the most frequently used set 
of rules.30 
 
Tax advantages, by means of interest deductions, could also be achieved in 
the case when the parent company is a Swedish tax subject covered by a 
particular tax regime. States and municipalities are exempted from tax and, 
consequently, interest income received by such juridical persons will not be 
subject to tax.31 Another tax subject suitable for tax planning of this kind is 
investment companies, i.e. companies whose main business is to hold 
securities of other companies purely for investment purposes. According to 
Chapter 39, Paragraph 14 of the Swedish Income Tax Act, investment 
companies shall deduct dividends paid to its shareholders as a cost.32 
Accordingly, the profit of such companies can be neutralized by setting off 
acquired interest payments against deductions for dividends paid.33 
 
The final practical example described in this paper involves a foreign 
company within a group, establishing a permanent establishment34 in 
Sweden. The foreign company obtains a loan from an affiliated company in 
order to finance the acquisition of shares in Swedish profit-making 
companies. The foreign company then allocates the loan and the shares to 
the permanent establishment. Consequently, the permanent establishment in 
Sweden is under the obligation to make interest payments to the (low-taxed) 
foreign lender.35 The interest payments are financed by group contributions 
from the acquired Swedish companies to the permanent establishment,36 
which enables the profit of the Swedish companies to be distributed and 
subjected to a more favourable taxation.37 
 
The parent company does not have to be the final receiver of the interest 
payments. In principle, it is possible for the parent to transfer the bond, e.g. 
                                                 
30 Memorandum (Fi2008/4093) of the Swedish Ministry of Finance, p. 12. 
31 See Chapter 7, Paragraph 2 of the Swedish Income Tax Act. 
32 Lodin, Sven-Olof et al. ”Inkomstskatt: en läro- och handbok i skatterätt”, Lund: 
Studentlitteratur, 2009, p. 542. 
33 Memorandum (Fi2008/4093) of the Swedish Ministry of Finance, p. 15. 
34 In Swedish: “Fast driftställe”. A permanent establishment may be defined as a fixed 
place of business through which activities of an organization are wholly or partially carried 
on; see Chapter 2, Paragraph 20 of the Swedish Income Tax Act. 
35 A permanent establishment is, according to Swedish national tax law, liable to tax on 
income attributable to the permanent establishment and is, under most international Double 
Tax Agreements, liable to tax in the State in which it is situated. Accordingly, the 
permanent establishment forms, from a fiscal perspective, a “separate entity” from the rest 
of the enterprise of which it is a part, enabling the foreign enterprise to allocate the liability 
to make interest payments to its permanent establishment in Sweden. 
36 According to Chapter 35, Paragraphs 2 a and 3 of the Swedish Income Tax Act, group 
contributions are allowed between a Swedish company and a permanent establishment of a 
foreign company on condition that the permanent establishment is liable to tax in Sweden. 
37 Tivéus, Ulf. ”Räntebetalningar till utlandet på koncerninterna lån finansierade med 
koncernbidrag – skatteflykt?” in Skattenytt, 2007, p. 690. 
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through a capital contribution, to a subsidiary of choice. Consequently, this 
form of tax planning entails a group of companies to transfer its respective 
profits to the company and tax jurisdiction of preference.38 However, it 
should be noted that in order to attain the desired tax advantage, it is 
required that capital transferred to subsidiaries will not be subjected to CFC 
taxation at the level of the parent company.39 
 
2.3 Legal framework conditions 
The most basic condition in the Swedish tax system, in order to achieve the 
intended tax effects when tax planning with interest deductions, is the 
unlimited deductibility of interest expenses. The principle that interest is 
deductible, unless there are explicit rules stating otherwise, is fundamental 
in the Swedish tax system.40 Chapter 16, Paragraph 1 of the Swedish 
Income Tax Act states that interest expenses are deductible irrespectively of 
if those interest expenses constitute costs for the acquiring or maintaining of 
an income. Furthermore, interest expenses are, in principle, deductible 
regardless of if the corresponding interest income is effectively subject to 
tax by the receiver.41 Moreover, it is important to note that, interest paid to a 
non-resident lender is not, according to the Swedish tax rules, subject to 
source taxation.42  
 
Another contributing factor, to the feasibility of the tax planning scheme at 
issue, is the rules in Chapter 25 a of the Swedish Income Tax Act, which 
states that capital gains on shares held for business purposes43 are exempted 
from tax. Hence, the capital gain made by the parent company when 
transferring the shares of its subsidiary will not trigger any taxation.44 
Finally, the possibility to make group contributions is also a factor of 
relevance, as it enables profit to be distributed from the profit-making 
company to the recently established company. However, the possibility to 
make group contributions is not essential for the undertaking of this type of 
tax planning, since the two companies in question could also be subject to a 
merger, resulting in that the profitable business activities are carried out in 
the same company holding the debt.45 
                                                 
38www.skatteverket.se/skatter/skatteupplagg/rantesnurror.4.3dfca4f410f4fc63c8680 
009710.html, visited 2009-11-16. 
39 Memorandum (Fi2008/4093) of the Swedish Ministry of Finance, p. 11. 
40 Lodin, Sven-Olof et al. ”Inkomstskatt: en läro- och handbok i skatterätt”, Lund: 
Studentlitteratur, 2009, p. 94. 
41 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 37. 
42 Tivéus, Ulf. ”Räntebetalningar till utlandet på koncerninterna lån finansierade med 
koncernbidrag – skatteflykt?” in Skattenytt, 2007, p. 691. 
43 In Swedish: “näringsbetingade andelar”; see Chapter 24, Paragraphs 13-16 of the 
Swedish Income Tax Act.  
44 Dahlberg, Mattias.”Internationell beskattning”, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2007, p. 86.  
45 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 34. 
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3 Limitations of the Deductibility 
of Intra-Group Interest Payments  
3.1 Overview 
On January 1, 2009, new rules regarding limitations of the deductibility of 
interest payments came into force in the Swedish legislation. The rules are 
found in Chapter 24, Paragraphs 10a – 10e of the Swedish Income Tax Act 
under the heading: Limitations of the deductibility of interest payments on 
certain loans.46  
 
3.2 Affiliated companies  
Principally, limitations of the right to deduct interest will only affect intra-
group transactions, i.e. transactions between affiliated companies.47 Chapter 
24, Paragraph 10a of the Swedish Income Tax Act states that two companies 
are affiliated if, firstly, either of them has, directly or indirectly, the deciding 
influence over the other company or, secondly, if the two companies are 
under principally the same management.48 It is the actual influence over the 
company that constitutes the deciding factor of whether two companies are 
considered to be under the same management – not the formal ownership 
conditions.49 The term company extends to all juridical persons, including 
states, municipalities and Swedish partnerships. Groups of companies 
owned by one or several natural persons also fall within the scope of the 
rules, although, it is only the companies that are considered as being 
affiliated, not the natural persons.50  
 
Naturally, a tax planning practice with interest deductions involving 
external parties brings about the same propitious tax effect as if the 
transactions in question are carried out within in a group of companies. 
However, as noted by the Swedish Tax Agency in their survey, there are in 
many respects considerable differences between internal and external 
transactions.51 As regards tax planning practices with interest deductions, at 
group-level, an internal acquisition of shares that is also internally financed, 
contrary to a transaction with external elements, only involves an 
organisational change. Furthermore, there is also the possibility to reiterate 
internal acquisitions when needed. Accordingly, the Swedish Tax Agency 
regarded external acquisitions to be motivated by business reasons to a 
                                                 
46 In Swedish: ”Begränsningar i avdragsrätten för ränta på vissa skulder”. 
47 In Swedish: ”Företag i intressegemenskap”. 
48 Memorandum (Fi2008/4093) of the Swedish Ministry of Finance, p. 26. 
49 Government Bill 2008/09:65, s. 48. 
50 Government Bill 2008/09:65, s. 46. 
51 See Proposal of the Swedish Tax Agency regarding Limitations of the deductibility of 
interest payments on certain loans, issued 2008-06-23 (No 131-348803-08/113), p. 20. 
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greater extent than internal ones, for what reason the need to legislate 
regarding external acquisitions was not investigated further.52 
 
3.3 Principal rules  
The principal rules, regarding limitations of the deductibility of interest 
payments on certain loans, are found in Chapter 24, Paragraphs 10b and 10c 
of the Swedish Income Tax Act. As is plain from the wording of the rules, 
the expression certain loans in the heading of rules extends to any of the 
three loan situations described below. Common to all loan situations, the 
company raising the loan has to be a member of a group of companies and 
the loan has to be obtained in order to finance the acquisition of shares53 in 
another affiliated company.54 
 
The first loan situation concerns the typical example, where the lender is an 
affiliated company. Of the tax planning practices identified by the Swedish 
Tax Agency, this solution was the most frequently used.55 The second loan 
situation covered by the rules is when an interim loan from an external party 
is replaced with an intra-group loan. The rules are applicable on the last-
mentioned loan provided that they would have been applicable on the first-
mentioned loan had the external company been an affiliated company.56 
Finally, the third situation extends to loans from an external party to the 
extent where a company, affiliated with the borrowing company, has a claim 
on the external party or its affiliates, on condition that the loan can be linked 
to the claim. This type of loans is called back-to-back loans.57 The rules 
regarding interim loans and back-to-back loans was introduced into the 
legislation as to prevent circumventions of the rule governing the typical 
example, i.e. where the lending company is affiliated with the borrowing 
company.58  
 
3.4 Complementary rules 
The rules aim to prevent a certain tax planning practice with interest 
deductions. Such tax planning practices are, as a rule, completely or, at 
least, mainly motivated by tax reasons. The intention is not for the rules to 
be applicable on business-motivated transactions.59 Therefore, two 
complementary rules are found in Chapter 24, Paragraph 10d and 10e of the 
                                                 
52 Memorandum (Fi2008/4093) of the Swedish Ministry of Finance, p. 26. 
53 In Swedish: “Delägarrätt”. The meaning of the term “share” is defined in Chapter 48, 
Paragraph 2 of the Swedish Income Tax Act. 
54 Memorandum (Fi2008/4093) of the Swedish Ministry of Finance, p. 13. 
55 Proposal of the Swedish Tax Agency regarding Limitations of the deductibility of interest 
payments on certain loans, issued 2008-06-23 (No 131-348803-08/113), p. 20. 
56 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 54. 
57 Memorandum (Fi2008/4093) of the Swedish Ministry of Finance, p. 33. 
58 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 55. 
59 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 56. 
 15
Swedish Income Tax Act, which exempts certain transactions from the 
purview of the principal rules described in Paragraph 3.3. 
 
3.4.1 The “ten percent”-rule 
The first complementary rule states that intra-group interest deductions are 
allowed if the corresponding interest income is taxed at a minimum tax rate 
of ten percent.60 The threshold was set at ten percent, as it was, according to 
statements in the preparatory work, believed to substantially reduce the 
incentives to carry through the tax planning practices at issue.61 When 
determining at what tax rate a particular interest income has been taxed, a 
hypothetical test is used, involving the hypothetical assumption that the 
interest income is the only income of the receiving company. Accordingly, 
regard should not be paid to the profit or loss made by the receiving 
company or to normally deductible expenses. The so-called “ten percent”-
rule is, therefore, not applicable in cases where the interest income is not 
taxed because it is e.g. neutralised by basic allowances or falls below the 
tax-free threshold.62 
 
The determination of the applied tax rate is, in principle, made according to 
the legislation in the home state of the receiving company. The situation 
where an outbound interest payment, according to the laws in the state of 
the receiver, is classified in a deviating way and, for that reason, is 
exempted from tax falls outside the scope of the “ten percent”-rule.63 The 
same applies in the case where the interest payment is treated as a nullity. 
Furthermore, the rule is not applicable, if the level of taxation accorded to 
the interest income is less than ten percent, due to the allocation of the 
interest income to a foreign permanent establishment – irrespectively of 
what level of taxation prescribed by the laws in the state of residence of the 
receiving company. Furthermore, the interest income has to be subject to 
actual taxation in the sense that there should not be a possibility of tax 
deferral for an indefinite time.64 
 
It is the intra-group company that has the actual right to the interest income, 
which is considered the lawful receiver of the interest payments. The 
meaning of the expression “the actual right” is, as stressed in the preparatory 
work, correspondent with the English legal term beneficial owner.65 By 
formulating the rule in such a way, the legislator intends to hinder taxpayers 
to circumvent it, by directing the interest payment to a temporary receiver, 
                                                 
60 Chapter 24, Paragraph 10d, Subsection 1 (1) and Chapter 24, Paragraph 10e, Subsection 
1 (1) of the Swedish Income Tax Act. 
61 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 59. 
62 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 85. 
63 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 59-60. 
64 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 63. 
65 The term refers, in short, to an individual who enjoys the benefits of owning a security or 
property, regardless of whose name the title is in. 
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resident in a state where the tax rate exceeds ten percent, who then passes 
the income on to the final receiver, situated in a low tax jurisdiction.66  
 
As regards companies, which are allowed to deduct dividends paid, i.e. 
investment companies, special legislation has been introduced. If the 
Swedish Tax Agency is able to show that the acquisition as well as the loan 
is not predominately67 business motivated, the “ten percent”-rule cannot be 
applied. A transaction is predominantly business motivated if motivated by 
business reasons to fifty percent.68 
 
3.4.2 Principally business motivated 
transactions 
The purpose of the second complementary rule is to exempt transactions, 
which are subjected to a low tax but are principally business motivated, 
from the scope of the principal rules regarding interest deduction 
limitations.69 The legislator calls, as stated in the preparatory work, 
attention to the need to exempt these transactions in order to prevent 
companies being hindered from carrying out its business activities.70  
 
The term principally71 business motivated extends to transactions, where the 
businesslike reasons are clearly superior to any other reasons to perform the 
transaction, such as appropriating oneself tax benefits. In order for a 
transaction to be classified as a principally business motivated one, the 
businesslike reasons have to amount to 75 percent. The legislator introduced 
this prerequisite to emphasize that the rule applies only to transactions 
where the businesslike reasons are the clearly superior ones but also to draw 
attention to the fact that the rule does not precludes transactions, which to a 
minor part are motivated by tax reasons.72 
 
The term business motivated aims to describe transactions, which are sound 
from the viewpoint of business economics and/or organisational change. 
The Council of Legislation noted that the expression business motivated was 
used as a diametrical opposite to the expression motivated by tax reasons. 
Since, in principle, the objective to minimize the total expenditure, 
including tax expenses, is business motivated, the Council proposed that the 
wording of the rules ought to be altered in order to clarify that the 
transaction needed to be business motivated disregarding all possible tax 
advantages.73 However, no such alteration of the rules’ wording was made. 
The Swedish Government regarded that it is in the nature of things that the 
                                                 
66 Memorandum (Fi2008/4093) of the Swedish Ministry of Finance, p. 35. 
67 In Swedish: ”Till övervägande del.” 
68 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 65. 
69 Chapter 24, Paragraph 10 d, Subsection 1 (2) and Chapter 24, Paragraph 10e, Subsection 
1 (2) of the Swedish Income Tax Act. 
70 Memorandum (Fi2008/4093) of the Swedish Ministry of Finance, p. 34. 
71 In Swedish: ”Huvudsakligen.” 
72 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 68. 
73 Consideration of the Council of Legislation regarding Fi2008/4093, issued 2008-10-06. 
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expression business motivated did not include tax reasons, considering that 
the rules are anti-avoidance rules.74 In order for the rule to apply, it is 
required that both the intra-group acquisition and the internal loan obtained 
for financing the acquisition, are business motivated.75 In an official 
standpoint,76 the Swedish Tax Agency states that it interpret the rule as 
calling for businesslike reasons on behalf of the lending as well as the 
borrowing company.  
 
The memorandum of the Swedish Ministry of Finance provides some 
examples of restructures motivated by organisational reasons that are to be 
regarded as business motivated. Situations mentioned are e.g. transactions 
where an external acquisition of a whole group is followed by internal 
acquisitions of those companies or restructures due to a future external sale 
of a certain branch of the group.77 However, in the same official standpoint 
as mentioned above, the Swedish Tax Agency declares that, in the Agency’s 
opinion, statements in the Government Bill take priority over statements and 
examples in the previous preparatory works such as the Swedish Ministry of 
Finance’s memorandum.78 As a consequence, as regards the situation where 
an external acquisition of a company is followed by an internal acquisition 
of that company, the Swedish Tax Agency  has expressed the opinion that, 
the external acquisition shall not be given an independent importance, but 
all relevant circumstances in the present case shall be taken under 
consideration.79 Nevertheless, the purpose of the rules is not to limit the 
deductibility of interest payments linked to external acquisitions, wherefore 
such acquisitions, according to the Swedish Tax Agency, will be one of 
those circumstances taken under consideration while assessing the tax. 
However, an external acquisition, financed through exchange of shares, will 
not be given heed to, as it arises no need to obtain a loan.80 
 
Moreover, in order to be able to determine whether a transaction is 
motivated by business reasons, the Swedish Tax Agency considers it 
necessary that the taxpayer, who invokes the second complementary rule, 
provides the Tax Agency with information regarding all stages in the 
transaction at issue as well as the causes that lies behind it and all other 
relevant circumstances. As regards the underlying causes, the provided 
information should contain, in particular, the business reasons motivating 
both the internal acquisition and the intra-group loan, including the business 
reasons for choosing the particular lender. Furthermore, information 
regarding what type of business the lender normally carries out and the 
lenders position in the group’s financing structure is of interest. Examples of 
other relevant circumstances are in what way the group structure as well as 
                                                 
74 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 88. 
75 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 68. 
76 In Swedish: “Skatteverkets ställningstagande”. 
77 Memorandum (Fi2008/4093) of the Swedish Ministry of Finance, p. 44. 
78 Official Standpoint of the Swedish Tax Agency, issued 2009-01-29 (No 131 157328-
09/111). 
79 Zester, Anitza. “Affärsmässiga skäl vad är innebörden” in Skattenytt 2009/5, p. 263. 
80 Official Standpoint of the Swedish Tax Agency, issued 2009-01-29 (No 131 157328-
09/111). 
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the finance structure has changed owing to the transaction and how the 
financing structure is made up within the group, i.e. whether general 
principles are applied or if there are differences depending on e.g. countries 
involved.81 
 
3.5 Burden of proof 
As regards the burden of proof, the general principle in Swedish tax law is 
that the burden of proof in respect of taxable income lies on the Swedish 
Tax Agency, whereas the taxpayer has the burden of proof in respect of 
deductible expenses. To mark, for any reason, a deviation from this general 
principle the word show is introduced into the wording of the rules, 
indicating which party bearing the burden of proof.82  
 
The Tax Agency is, according to the wording of the rules regarding 
investment companies, liable to show that a transaction subject to inquiry is 
not predominantly business motivated. In all other cases, the burden of 
proof is allocated in accordance with the general principle. Consequently, in 
order to be able to deduct interest on loans, falling within the scope of the 
general rules, all taxpayers, except investment companies, have to provide 
information to the Swedish Tax Agency supporting an application of any of 
the complementary rules. 83 
 
As a last remark, the expressions predominantly and principally business 
motivated do not refer to the level of proof, but are only used to bring out 
clearly that the transactions have to be motivated by business reasons to a 
certain degree.84 
                                                 
81 Official Standpoint of the Swedish Tax Agency, issued 2009-01-29 (No 131 157328-
09/111). 
82 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 72. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
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4 EU Law in the Field of Direct 
Taxation 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter contains a survey of the legal framework within the Union law 
in respect of direct taxation. The purpose is to provide a general 
comprehension on the subject, which is helpful in understanding the further 
discussion as well as the choice of materials of which it is based upon. 
 
4.2 The Treaty and national tax law 
The Swedish tax legislation has in many aspects undergone large changes 
following the EU membership. The field of indirect taxation has been 
subject to an advanced harmonization within the Union. The Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union explicitly provides the European Union 
with the powers necessary for the implementation of such harmonization 
measures.85 However, as regards matters of direct taxation, there is little 
explicit reference in the Treaty and it does not contain any provisions, which 
directly grounds legislative competence to the Union in this field of law.86 
Therefore, direct taxation, such as income taxation, was, for quite some 
time, considered as a matter exclusively within the competence of the 
individual Member States.87  
 
The hesitation of the Member States, to delegate competence regarding 
fiscal matters to the Union, is a reflection of the special significance of the 
power of taxation, as the public funds raised by taxation enables the exercise 
of its governmental authority. Hence, the power to tax ensures the 
sovereignty of the state, signified domestically by supreme authority and 
internationally as independence under international law.88 However, despite 
the scarcity of provisions regarding direct taxation in the Treaty, EU law has 
exercised a considerable influence on the tax laws in the Member States, a 
fact that will be examined further in the following paragraphs. 
 
4.2.1 Article 115 TFEU 
As the Treaty does not provide the European Union with any direct 
legislative competence regarding direct taxes, EU measures concerning this 
                                                 
85 See Articles 110 – 113 TFEU (ex Articles 90 – 93 TEC). 
86 Dahlberg, Mattias. “Direct Taxation in Relation to the Freedom of establishment and the 
Free Movement of Capital”, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 44. 
87 Lehner, Moris. “Limitations of the national power of taxation by the fundamental 
freedoms and non-discrimination clauses of the EC Treaty” in EC Tax Review 2000/1, p. 5. 
88 Koefler, Georg W. “Towards a Homogeneous EC Direct Tax Law; an assessment of the 
member states”, edited by Cécile Brokelind, Amsterdam: IBFD, 2007, p. 59. 
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field of law depends on the general harmonisation provision set out in 
Article 115 TFEU (ex Article 94 TEC).89 Article 115 TFEU states that the 
Council shall issue directives for the approximation of national laws as 
directly affect the establishment or functioning of the internal market. In 
order for the Council to reach such a decision, unanimity is required, which 
unquestionable limits the prospects of an intra-Union approximation of 
legislation in the field of direct taxation.90  
 
To date, only four directives in respect of direct taxation have been adopted 
on the basis of Article 115 TFEU, namely the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, 
the Merger Directive, the Interest and Royalty Directive and the Savings 
Directive.91 As the question concerning compatibility of the Swedish rules 
on limitations of the deductibility of intra-group interest payments with 
secondary law falls out of the scope of this study, the directives will not be 
examined further.92  
 
4.2.2 The impact of Court decisions 
The Court of Justice is the final interpreter of EU law. Article 19 (1) TFEU 
(ex Article 220 TEC) states that the Court shall ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of the Treaty the law is observed. In lack of 
comprehensive legislation, the case law of the Court of Justice has in a 
substantial way contributed to the development and shaping of the direct tax 
law within the Union.93 However, the question of whether the Court was 
competent in matters of direct taxation was, for some time, disputed.94 In 
the Schumacker95 case, the Court stated:  
 
“Although, as Community law stands at present, direct taxation does not as such fall 
within the purview of the Community, the powers retained by the Member States must 
nevertheless be exercised consistently with Community law.”96  
 
The Schumacker case was the first case in which the Court declared itself 
competent to decide on national direct tax law’s consistency with EU law 
and the fundamental freedoms in particular. An ever-growing number of 
cases concerning this issue have since followed, clearing any doubts 
                                                 
89 Terra, Ben J.M. and Peter J. Wattel. “European Tax Law”, Amsterdam: Kluwer Law, 
2008, p. 18. 
90 Dahlberg, Mattias. “Direct Taxation in Relation to the Freedom of establishment and the 
Free Movement of Capital”, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 44. 
91 Terra, Ben J.M. and Peter J. Wattel. “European Tax Law”, Amsterdam: Kluwer Law, 
2008, p. 20. 
92 See also Paragraph 1.4 on Delimitations. 
93 Hilling, Maria. “Free movement and Tax Treaties in the Internal Market”, Uppsala: 
Iustus Förlag, 2005, p. 35. 
94 Dahlberg, Mattias. “Direct Taxation in Relation to the Freedom of establishment and the 
Free Movement of Capital”, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 45. 
95 C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR 1-225. 
96 C-279/93 Schumacker [1995] ECR 1-225, para. 21. 
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regarding the Court of Justice’s competence in the field of direct taxation.97 
The resulting case law has, unquestionably, largely affected several 
components of national taxation systems and provided the Member States 
with crucial indications on how to develop their tax policies.98  
 
A vast number of direct taxation cases has concerned the fundamental 
freedoms provided for in the Treaty. The fundamental freedoms consist of 
the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital between Member 
States.99 The free movement provisions are essential for the creation of the 
internal market, which in itself is one of the means for the realisation of the 
European Union. An internal market is believed to ensure optimal allocation 
of resources, enhancing the economic welfare of the Member States.100 The 
free movement of persons can be divided into two different freedoms, viz. 
the free movement of workers and the freedom of establishment.101 The 
latter freedom, being the subject of this thesis, is examined further in the 
following chapter. 
                                                 
97 The Schumacker case was the first case where the Court expressively dealt with the 
question of competence in the field of direct taxation, however, it was not the first case 
concerning matters of direct taxation per se; see cases C-6/60 Humblet v Belgian State 
[1960] ECR 559 and C-270/83 Commission v France (“Avoir Fiscal”) [1986] ECR 0273. 
98 Cerioni, Luca. “EU corporate law and EU company tax law”, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2007, p. 36. 
99 Dahlberg, Mattias. “Direct Taxation in Relation to the Freedom of establishment and the 
Free Movement of Capital”, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 70. 
100 Hilling, Maria. “Free movement and Tax Treaties in the Internal Market”, Uppsala: 
Iustus Förlag, 2005, p. 69. 
101 Barnad, Catherine. “The substantive law of the EU: The Four Freedoms”, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 249. 
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5 The Freedom of Establishment 
5.1 Overview 
In this chapter, the purport of the freedom of establishment within the 
meaning of EU law is described. In order to be able to determine whether 
the Swedish legislation regarding limitations of the deductibility of intra-
group interest payments are contrary to the free movement-provision in 
question, it is, of course, important to elucidate the scope of the rights it 
confers to the taxpayers. Since the Swedish legislation on interest deduction 
limitations targets interest payments made by companies only, the chapter is 
focusing on the rights conferred to legal persons. 
 
5.2 Articles 49 and 54 TFEU 
The freedom of establishment is one of the fundamental freedoms within the 
EU, which are central to the effective functioning of the internal market.102 
The principal rule regarding the freedom of establishment is set out in 
Article 49 TFEU (ex Article 43 TEC) and reads as follows: 
 
Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State 
shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up of 
agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the 
territory of any Member State. 
 
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-
employed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or 
firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54, under the conditions 
laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is 
effected, subject to the provisions of the Chapter relating to capital. 
 
Article 49 (1) TFEU provides an obligation of restrictions on the freedom of 
establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another 
Member State shall be prohibited, that is a right to national treatment.103 
The first sentence of Article 49 (1) refers to primary establishments, i.e. 
nationals exercising their right of establishment by participating in the 
incorporation of a company under the laws of another Member State.104 
Article 49 (1), the second sentence, deals with secondary establishments, 
                                                 
102 Anthony, Arnull. The European Union and its Court of Justice, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006, p. 462. 
103 Hilling, Maria. “Free movement and Tax Treaties in the Internal Market”, Uppsala: 
Iustus Förlag, 2005, p. 124. 
104 Barnad, Catherine. “The substantive law of the EU: The Four Freedoms”, Oxford: 
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involving the situations where a national is setting up branches, agencies or 
subsidiaries.105  
 
5.2.1 The rights conferred on legal persons 
The term nationals primarily refers to individuals or, to use the terminology 
of the European Union, natural persons. However, the rights conferred by 
Article 49 TFEU extends to legal persons as well, a fact that becomes 
evident as Article 49 TFEU is read in conjunction with Article 54 TFEU (ex 
Article 48 TEC).106  Article 54 (1) TFEU provides that: 
 
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having 
their registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the 
Union shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural 
persons.  
 
According to case law of the Court, the factor that connects a company with 
the legal system of a particular state is the corporate seat of the company in 
question, as nationality in respect of individuals.107 It should be noted that, 
the reference made by the Court of Justice to the corporate seat includes all 
three of the criteria mentioned in Article 54 (1) TFEU, namely registered 
office, central administration or principal place of business.108 The meaning 
of the expression companies or firms is defined in Article 54 (2) TFEU as 
companies or firms constituted under civil or commercial law, including 
cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private 
law, save for those that are non-profit making.109 
 
All EU-nationals have the right to establish themselves through a primary 
establishment whereas a secondary establishment requires an already 
existing establishment within the Union.110 Companies can exercise their 
right of primary establishment by participating in the incorporation of a 
company in another Member State. In that case, Article 55 TFEU (Article 
294 TEC) ensures national treatment to the out-of-state company as regards 
participation in the capital of the newly established company.111 What level 
of holding needed in order to invoke the freedom of establishment was dealt 
with in the Baars112 case. The Court stressed that control or management of 
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the company were factors connected with the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment or in the Court’s own words: “… when the holding gives [the 
shareholders] definite influence over the company’s decisions and allows 
them to determine its activities.”113 However, in the judgment, the Court 
provided no general guidelines of to determine when those conditions were 
met, why an analysis on a case-by-case basis is necessary.114 Although rare, 
a primary establishment can also occur where a company transfers its seat to 
another Member State.115 In order to make the provisions on the right of 
secondary establishments effective, national rules prescribing that business 
can be conducted only through primary establishments are prohibited.116  
 
Once a company has accessed the market in the host state, it must be 
ensured the enjoyment of national treatment by the host state as long as it 
continues to exercise the right of establishment. For example, the Court 
expressed this point of view in the case Commission v Italy.117 The case 
concerned an Italian law, stating that only companies, in which the majority 
of the shares were state-held, could conclude agreements in respect of 
providing public authorities with data-processing systems. As the Court 
found the law to essentially favour Italian companies, it did not comply with 
Article 49 TFEU.118 
 
The wording of Article 49 TFEU implies that it only prohibits restrictions of 
the freedom of establishment in the legislation of host state. However, the 
freedom of establishment also, to some extent, compromises a right of 
departure. As regards the situation where a company is transferring its seat, 
the home state are, at the present stage of EU law, allowed to impose 
restrictions on emigrating companies.119 The case Daily Mail120 concerned 
an English company that wanted to transfer its seat to the Netherlands in 
order to avoid paying taxes in the UK. In its judgment, the Court of Justice 
declared that the freedom of establishment did not confer a right to 
companies, incorporated under the law of a Member State, to transfer their 
head office to another Member State while retaining the status under the 
legislation of the first Member State.121  
 
However, by reference to case law of the Court, it appears as if restrictive 
measures of the right to departure could only be imposed in respect of 
primary establishments, that is to say when a company transfers its company 
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seat. As regards primary establishments, the Court decided in the case X and 
Y AB122 that Article 49 TFEU precluded the application of provisions 
hindering a company incorporated under its laws from establishing itself in 
another Member State.123 
 
5.2.2 Definition of establishment 
Article 49 (2) TFEU deals with the purview of the expression freedom of 
establishment. As regards companies, the Article in question stipulates that 
the freedom of establishment include the right to set up and manage 
undertakings under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the 
law of the country where such establishment is effected.124 In the case 
Factortame,125 the Court of Justice defined the expression further by stating 
that the concept of establishment within the meaning of Article 49 TFEU et 
seq. involves ”the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed 
establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period.”126 From 
this statement, the following three criteria regarding the meaning of the term 
establishment can be deduced: (1) the person in question has to be engaged 
in some sort of economic activity; (2) the activity has to be of a permanent 
nature; (3) the activity has to have a cross-border character.127  
 
As regards the first criterion, the fact that a company, in order to benefit 
from the freedom of establishment, has to be engaged in an economic 
activity is underlined by the wording of Article 54 (2) TFEU, which 
excludes non-profit-making enterprises from its field of application. 
Moreover, the economic activity has to be genuine, meaning that a company 
cannot rely on the rights conferred to it by the Treaty if establishing an 
artificial arrangement for the purpose of e.g. enjoying more favourable tax 
treatment in the host state.128 Regarding the second criterion, an activity of 
permanent nature has been defined by the Court as the involvement in the 
economic life of a Member State on a stable and continuous basis.129 The 
third criterion excludes purely internal situations, i.e. situations where all 
the facts are confined within one Member State and therefore no connection 
with EU law, from the scope of Article 49 TFEU.130 However, according to 
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Court’s case law,131 the scope of Article 49 TFEU extends, in principle, to 
the situation where a national is subjected to reverse discrimination, even 
though the situation appears to lack cross-border elements. Reverse 
discrimination refers to the situation where a Member State subjects its own 
nationals to a more burdensome taxation than foreigners or non-residents.132  
 
The criteria outlined above are at help as to understand the concept of 
establishment within the meaning of EU law, although, the list is non-
exhaustive. In the Gebhard133 case, the Court stated that the concept of 
establishment should be interpreted broadly. Considering the various nature 
and sizes of different establishments, an unambiguous and complete 
definition of the concept in question is difficult, if not impossible, to create. 
Therefore, an examination of all relevant facts and circumstances is 
necessary for a determination of whether an establishment exists.134 
 
5.2.3 Direct effect 
A Treaty provision can be ascribed direct effect, enabling companies to take 
advantage of EU law provisions regardless of national texts, which are there 
to put them into practice.135 The basic conditions, in order for a Treaty 
provision to be ascribed direct effect, are that the provision in question is 
clear, unconditional and capable of producing rights for individuals.136 The 
provision has to be clear and unconditional in the sense that the applicability 
of the provision cannot be dependent upon an eligibility assessment or that 
further measures are taken by the EU or a Member State.137 In the 
Reyners138 case, the Court of Justice declared that the provisions concerning 
the freedom of establishment had direct effect.139 
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6 Limitations of the Freedom of 
Establishment 
6.1 Overview 
The chapter contains a description of the two different approaches applied 
by the Court of Justice when determining whether a national tax measure 
constitutes a restriction of the freedom of establishment. Such a description 
is essential for the purposes of this thesis, as it provides necessary 
information of how to approach the question of whether the Swedish rules 
on interest deduction limitations restrict the freedom of establishment. 
 
6.2 The non-discrimination approach  
The principle of equal treatment is in close relation with the principle of 
non-discrimination. There are several provisions in the Treaty, giving 
expression to the latter principle to greater or lesser degree. Article 25 TFEU 
(ex Article 12 TEC) contains a general prohibition of discrimination on the 
ground of nationality. The general prohibition is supplemented by 
prohibition provisions targeting certain areas of EU law, such as Article 49 
TFEU regarding the freedom of establishment.140 The Court of Justice has 
declared that Article 25 TFEU is only to be directly applied on matters, 
which are not governed by any specific non-discrimination provisions.141 
Accordingly, in matters concerning the freedom of establishment, Article 49 
TFEU is to be applied.  
 
6.2.1 Defintion of discrimination 
In order to be able to determining the presence of discriminatory treatment, 
the meaning of the term discrimination has to, of course, first be 
distinguished. Traditionally, the concept of discrimination within the 
meaning of EU law has been defined as different treatment of comparable 
situations or equal treatment of non-comparable situations.142 The term can 
be divided into two different forms of discrimination, viz. direct and indirect 
discrimination. Direct discrimination is at hand when a national rule 
expressively stipulates the criterion of nationality, whereas indirect 
discrimination extends to situations where a national rule uses a criterion 
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other than nationality but has the same effect as if nationality had been the 
criterion used.143  
 
Generally, cases of direct discrimination are, by their nature, quite easily 
detected. The Bosman144 case, concerning the free movement of workers, 
provides an illustrative example of national rules resulting in direct 
discrimination. The case challenged the legality of the system of transfers 
for football players and the existence of so-called quota systems, whereby 
only a limited number of non-German players were allowed to play in a club 
match. Obviously, the quota systems were limiting the freedom to contract 
of professional soccer players who were not German nationals.145 However, 
rules that are discriminatory in an indirect way may be harder to discover, as 
they are neutral in their wording. It is not required that a rule, in order to be 
described as indirectly discriminatory, was intended to have such effects – 
the effect alone is sufficient.146 Furthermore, according to the Court’s 
holding in the O'Flynn147 case, a statutory provision need only be liable to 
result in less advantageous treatment to be deemed indirectly 
discriminatory.148 
 
As regards matters of direct taxation, national rules generally do not refer to 
nationality as a differentiating criterion, but the residence of the tax subject 
or the source of the income. Thus, indirect discrimination is common in 
direct tax matters.149 However, in respect of corporate taxation, the 
applications of rules, distinguishing on the basis of seat between domestic 
and foreign companies, which result in unfavourable treatment of the 
foreign company, are directly discriminatory.150 This follows from the fact 
that the seat, according to Article 54 TFEU, is the criterion connecting a 
company to the legal system of a particular Member State.151 The 
distinction between the two concepts is not only conceptual, as direct 
discrimination, in contrast to indirect discrimination, can only be justified 
on grounds explicitly provided for in the Treaty.152 Typically, both forms of 
discrimination will concern the legislation in the host state, but it can also 
occur in the home state, e.g. in respect of foreign inbound source taxation.153 
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6.2.2 Objectively comparable situations 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, in order for the non-discrimination 
principle to apply, it is required that the two compared situations are 
comparable.154 The majority of the comparability-tests performed by the 
Court of Justice have concerned the situation of residents compared to the 
one of non-residents.155 Generally, according to the Court’s case law, the 
situations of residents and non-residents are not comparable. In a number of 
cases, the Court has held that the reason behind such a general rule is that 
there are objective differences between residents and non-residents from the 
point of view of the source of the income and the possibility of taking 
account of their ability to pay tax.156 However, as regards the discrimination 
analysis applied to companies, the comparison appears, in principle, to be 
focused on whether a company has been granted the same beneficial tax 
treatment rather than the company’s general situation.157  
 
However, the general rule stating that residents and non-residents are not in 
comparable situations have in the Court’s case law, been subjected to 
several exceptions, largely diminishing its scope. For example, in the case 
Royal Bank of Scotland158, the Court of Justice concluded that Greek rules 
regarding taxation of banks were contrary to the freedom of establishment, 
as companies seated in a state other than Greece were taxed at a higher rate. 
The Court declared that there were no objective differences between 
resident banks and banks established in Greece through branches. The fact 
that resident banks had unlimited tax liability whereas the tax liability of 
branches was limited did not prevent the two categories of companies from 
being considered, all other things being equal, as being in a comparable 
situation.159  
 
The Court has, in a number of cases reiterated its reasoning in Royal Bank of 
Scotland, i.e. that the mere fact that resident companies have unlimited tax 
liability whereas non-resident companies have limited tax liability does not 
preclude that these two categories of companies are in objectively 
comparable situations.160 In other words, in so far as a Member State asserts 
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taxing jurisdiction over non-residents, it must, in principle, ensure equality 
as compared to residents.161  
 
6.3 The non-restriction approach 
As is evident from the more recent case law of the Court of Justice, the 
Court has tended to gradually extend the prohibition of discriminatory rules 
to prohibitions of rules that otherwise have a restrictive effect on cross-
border movements within the Union.162 The Court has referred to rules, 
which have been found to have such effects, as obstacles, hindrances or 
restrictions to the freedom of establishment.163 In the following, the term 
restrictions will be used to describe rules or measures that have restrictive 
effects on the free movement without constituting discrimination.  
 
One might argue that an extension of the prohibition to also include 
restrictions is a necessity for the achievement of the overall objectives of the 
European Union, as prohibition on grounds of discrimination may be 
considered as too limited.164 The prohibition of discrimination due to 
nationality is, in literature, often described as equality-based whereas the 
prohibition of restrictions is designed as liberty rights.165 However, it is 
common that the Court, when applying the non-restriction approach, makes 
a comparison between a domestic situation, which does not involve the 
freedom of establishment, and a situation where this freedom has been 
exercised.166 The non-restriction approach has i.a. been applied in situations 
where national disadvantageous measures has not directly affected foreign 
companies exercising its right to establishment, but their resident 
subsidiaries.167 Restrictive measures can occur in both the host state and the 
home state.168 
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7 The Swedish Rules and Possible 
Limiting Effects on the Freedom 
of Establishment 
7.1 Overview 
In this Chapter, I will examine and provide an answer to the first question 
required to achieve the purpose of this thesis:  
 
• Are the Swedish rules on limitations of the deductibility of intra-
group interest payments in breach of Articles 49 and 54 TFEU on 
the freedom of establishment?169  
 
In the following paragraph, I will, in order to put the propounded question in 
the relevant context, shortly summarize the findings of the previous 
chapters. 
 
7.2 Approaching the problem 
In approaching the question outlined in the previous paragraph, I will be 
primarily focusing on the tax planning scheme depicted in Figure 1, namely 
the situation where interest is paid by a Swedish subsidiary (New AB) to its 
low-taxed foreign parent (Company A). New AB has obtained the loan from 
Company A in order to finance the acquisition of Company B, a Swedish 
profit-making company member of the same group.170 It is presupposed that 
all companies involved are capital share companies. 
 
By establishing itself in another Member State through a subsidiary, 
Company A has exercised its right to primary establishment as provided for 
by the freedom of establishment. Hence, the host state, in this case Sweden, 
must ensure the enjoyment of national treatment to Company A.171 A 
primary establishment, like New AB, is a legal person of its own and its 
profits will therefore be subject to tax in the state of establishment. The 
profits of a subsidiary are only subject to tax at the level of the parent 
company if they are somehow distributed there. With that being said, it 
should be emphasized that it is the parent company that has exercised its 
right to establishment and, consequently, is able to invoke the rights 
provided for by the Treaty – not the subsidiary. 
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The right to national treatment precludes the application of tax rules, which 
are limiting the parent company from exercising the freedom of 
establishment, i.e. tax rules that are either discriminatory in their 
application or otherwise constitute a restriction of the freedom of 
establishment. A rule is discriminatory if it distinguishes on the basis of a 
company’s seat (direct discrimination) or residence (indirect 
discrimination). The concept of restriction is wider in its application, 
covering rules that, although not discriminatory, otherwise have restrictive 
effects on cross-border movements within the Union. In either case, a 
limitation is at hand when comparable situations are treated differently as 
well as when non-comparable situations are treated equally.172  
 
7.2.1 The Swedish legislation at issue 
The Swedish legislation regarding limitations of the deductibility of intra-
group interest payments is found in Chapter 24, Paragraphs 10a – 10e of the 
Swedish Income Tax Act. In Paragraph 10a, the meaning of the expression 
affiliated companies is defined.173 Paragraphs 10b and 10c contain the 
principle rules, stating that interest expenses are not deductible if 
attributable to an intra-group loan obtained for the purposes of acquiring 
shares of another company within the same group as well as back-to-back 
and interim loans obtained to circumvent the interest deduction 
limitation.174  
 
Nevertheless, interest payments, which are attributable to loans falling 
within the scope of the general rules, are deductible provided that any of the 
two exception rules in Paragraphs 10d and 10e is applicable. The first 
exception rule – the “ten percent”-rule – precludes the application of the 
general rules in cases where the corresponding interest income is taxed, in 
the hands of the receiver, at a minimum tax rate of ten percent. In cases 
where the corresponding interest income is taxed at a lower rate, the second 
exception rule precludes an application of the general rules if the transaction 
at issue is principally business motivated.175 
 
Based on the information above, it can be concluded that the principal rules 
alone do not contain a prerequisite distinguishing either on the basis of seat, 
nor on the basis of residency. Thus, the principal rules apply in the same 
manner in relation to interest paid to domestic as well as foreign parent 
companies of all kinds. However, if the principal rules are read in 
conjunction with the “ten percent”-rule, a minimum rate of taxation of the 
corresponding interest income amounting to ten percent is required in order 
for interest payments to be deductible. Accordingly, as the present corporate 
tax rate in Sweden amounts to 26,3 percent,176 interest payments made to 
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parent companies, which are resident in Sweden and subjected to Swedish 
corporation tax, are always deductible. The question is whether such tax 
rules, which may, in practice, largely target interest payments to non-
resident parent companies, constitute a restriction of the freedom of 
establishment in the eyes of EU law.  
 
7.3 Relevant case law of the Court of 
Justice 
In the following, I will give an account of four cases from the Court of 
Justice, providing some guidance in respect of how to answer the question 
whether the Swedish rules constitute a limitation of the freedom of 
establishment or not. The cases are referred only in so far as they concern 
this question, thus the parts concerning whether the rules were found to be 
justified or met the requirement of proportionality is left out.177 
 
7.3.1 C-374/04 ACT Group Litigation 
The case ACT Group Litigation concerned a British system of taxation 
known as partial imputation, under which, in order to avoid economic 
double taxation when a resident company distributed profits, part of the 
corporation tax paid by that company was imputed to its shareholders.  
 
The basis of the partial imputation system was, on the one hand, advance 
payment of corporation tax by the company making the distribution, and, on 
the other hand, a tax credit granted to shareholders who had received a 
dividend. A payment of dividends by a resident company, granted a tax 
credit to the ultimate shareholders receiving the dividends on condition that 
they were either resident in the UK or non-residents seated in a Member 
State with which the UK had concluded a DTC providing for such a tax 
credit. However, the rules did not grant a tax credit to other non-resident 
companies receiving such dividends.  
The Court of Justice declared that national tax systems, for the prevention or 
mitigation of chain taxation in respect of dividends, must apply in the same 
way in relation to residents as well as to non-residents – provided that they 
are in objectively comparable situations. The Court stated that, as far as it 
concerned inbound dividends, the situation of resident shareholders was 
comparable irrespectively of if the dividends were paid from a domestic 
company or a company resident in another Member State. This was because 
both dividends deriving from a national source and those deriving from a 
foreign source might be subject to, firstly, in the case of corporate 
shareholders, a series of charges to tax and, secondly, in the case of ultimate 
shareholders, to economic double taxation.  
                                                 
177 The two latter cases, C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst and C-524/04 Thin Cap Group 
Litigation are referred in respect these parts, i.e. justification and propotionality, in Chapter 
9. 
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However, according to the Court, the same did not apply in respect of 
outbound dividends. When the company making the distribution and the 
shareholder receiving the dividend were not resident in the same Member 
State, the Member State of residence of the distributing company was not in 
the same position regarding double taxation as the Member State of 
residence of the recipient shareholder. The Court acknowledged that a 
requirement on the State of residence of the distributing company to secure 
that profits distributed to a non-resident is not subject to double or chain 
taxation, implies that that State would be obliged to renounce its right to tax 
a profit generated through an economic activity undertaken on its territory. 
Furthermore, the State of residence of the recipient shareholder was usually 
the best placed to determine the shareholder’s ability to pay tax. Moreover, 
such reasoning was found to be in line with the objectives of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive178, which requires the Member State of the recipient 
(corporate) shareholder to avoid chain taxation of dividends distributed from 
a company resident in another Member State. The directive was not 
applicable in the present case, since the shareholders in question did not 
meet the requirement of a minimum holding of 25 percent in the capital of 
the distributing company. 
 
Consequently, in a situation like the one in the present case, the Court held 
that it is compatible with Community law, when a resident company 
distributes dividends, for the Member State of residence of that company to 
grant tax credits only to resident recipient companies and not to non-resident 
recipient companies which are not taxable in that Member State. The fact 
that not all of the DTCs concluded between the UK and other Member 
States provided for a tax credit did not change the conclusion reached by the 
Court. 
 
7.3.2 C-282/07 Truck Center  
Wickler Finances, a company incorporated and resident in Luxembourg, 
was holding 48 percent of the share capital of Truck Center, a company 
incorporated and resident in Belgium. Whereas withholding tax under 
Belgian was levied on interest on a loan that was paid to the Luxemburg 
parent, no such withholding tax would have been levied if the parent were a 
resident of Belgium.  
 
The Court of Justice noted that the effect of the Belgian legislation at issue 
was that the procedure for the charging of the tax varied, depending on the 
place where the company receiving the interest had its seat. The Belgian 
rules therefore appeared to be discriminatory. However, the Court came to 
the conclusion that, in the present case, the situation of a foreign parent, 
receiving interest payments from a domestic subsidiary, was not objectively 
comparable to such a situation involving domestic companies only. 
                                                 
178 Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation 
applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States. 
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Consequently, the rules were not to be seen as limiting the freedom of 
establishment. The conclusion was based on the following reasoning.  
 
Firstly, the Court pointed out that the Belgian State was in different 
positions depending on whether the receiving company was a resident or a 
non-resident. In the former case, the Belgian State acted in its capacity as 
the state of residence of the companies concerned whereas, in the latter case, 
it was acting in its capacity as the state of source. Secondly, the Court noted 
that the two situations subject to comparison gave rise to two distinct 
charges, which rested on separate legal bases. The Court emphasized that, 
although withholding tax would not be charged on interest payments made 
to resident companies, those payments would still be taxed by the Belgian 
State as they remained subject to corporation tax in the hands of the 
receiving company. Furthermore, according to the Double Tax Convention 
between Belgium and Luxembourg, the Belgian state was entitled to tax 
outbound interest payments. Finally, the Court stressed that a resident and a 
non-resident company were also in different situations with regard to 
recovery of the tax. Contrary to non-resident recipient companies, resident 
recipient companies were directly subject to the supervision of the Belgian 
Tax Authorities, which could ensure compulsory recovery of taxes. 
 
The Court of Justice also stated that difference in treatment, resulting from 
the Belgian tax legislation at issue, did not necessarily procure an advantage 
for resident recipient companies. In the view of the Court, the reason for this 
was partly that the amount of withholding tax deducted from the interest 
paid to a non-resident company was significantly lower than the corporation 
tax charged on the income of resident companies, partly because resident 
companies were obliged to make advance payments of corporation tax. 
 
7.3.3 C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst 
Lankhorst-Hohorst was a German company, which was wholly owned by 
the Dutch company LH BV. LH BV was, on its part, wholly owned by 
another Dutch company, Lankhorst Taselbaar. In 1996, Lankhorst-Hohorst 
obtained a loan from Lankhorst Taselbaar, which was repayable over 10 
years in fixed annual instalments in addition to interest. The loan, which 
was intended as a substitute for capital, was accompanied by a letter of 
support under which Lankhorst Taselbaar waived repayment if third party 
creditors made claims against Lankhorst-Hohorst The loan enabled 
Lankhorst-Hohorst to reduce part of its bank borrowing and thus to reduce 
its interest charges. For the years 1996 – 1998, the balance sheet of 
Lankhorst-Hohorst showed a deficit not covered by equity capital, i.e. it was 
“thinly” capitalized. 
 
According to German law, interest payments, made to a shareholder with a 
determining influence and who was not entitled to corporation tax credit, 
was, under certain circumstances, regarded as a covert distribution of 
profits. One such circumstance was if the borrowing company was thinly 
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capitalized (the applied debt-to-equity ratio was 3:1). Consequently, in its 
corporation tax assessment notices, in respect of the years 1997 and 1998, 
the German Tax Authorities took the view that the interest paid to Lankhorst 
Taselbaar was equivalent to a covert distribution of profits and taxed 
Lankhorst-Hohorst on them as such at the rate of 30 percent. 
 
The Court of Justice noted that, when examining the existence of an 
obstacle to the freedom of establishment, a large majority of resident parent 
companies received a tax credit whereas non-resident parent companies, as a 
rule, did not. Corporations incorporated under German law, which were 
exempted from corporation tax and, consequently, not entitled to tax credit 
were essentially legal persons governed by public law and companies 
carrying out their business in a specific field or performing tasks benefiting 
the public good. Against this background, the Court stated that it was 
apparent that, in principle, the interest paid by a resident subsidiary on loan 
capital provided by a non-resident parent company was taxed as a covert 
dividend, whereas, in the case of two domestic companies interest paid was 
treated as expenditure. 
 
The Court concluded that such a difference in treatment between resident 
subsidiary companies, based on the seat of their parent company, constituted 
a restriction of the freedom of establishment, which was prohibited by 
Article 43 TEC (now Article 49 TFEU).  The fact that the rules also applied 
in relation to interest payments to resident companies was, in this case, 
irrelevant. Because of the specific characteristics of the resident companies 
not entitled to tax credit they could not be validly compared to non-resident 
companies, like Lankhorst Taselbaar, carrying out its business for profit and 
subjected to corporation tax. 
 
7.3.4 C-524/04 Thin Cap Group Litigation 
The Court, in the Thin Cap Group Litigation case, reiterates the reasoning in 
Lankhorst-Hohorst. The case concerned UK thin capitalisation rules, similar 
to those at issue in Lankhorst-Hohorst case. The rules provided that interest 
paid to a company belonging to the same group, under certain 
circumstances, was treated as distribution, to the extent that the interest 
represented more than a reasonable commercial return on the loan. 
However, interest paid to a non-resident company was treated as 
distribution, even if the interest was market orientated. 
 
The Court noted that the fact that interest paid to an affiliated company was 
treated as distribution was capable of increasing the liability of the 
borrowing company to tax because taxable profits could not be reduced. The 
UK Government argued, on its part, that the legislation at issue did not 
constitute a direct and certain obstacle to the freedom of establishment, 
since it had neither the object nor the effect of making it less attractive for 
foreign companies to establish themselves in the United Kingdom. Rather, 
the UK legislation merely distinguished between situations, which were not 
 37
comparable. The UK Government held that it was only in a multinational 
context that a group of companies, by financing a UK subsidiary by loan 
rather than equity capital, could organise a transfer of profits to a low tax 
jurisdiction, thereby avoiding UK taxation.  
 
The Court agreed that the risk of tax avoidance through transfer of profits 
might be higher in a multinational group. However, that did not mean that 
rules, adopted by Member States for the purposes of dealing with the 
situation of multinational groups, would not, in some cases, constitute a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment. Accordingly, the UK rules were 
found to constitute a restriction of the freedom of establishment, since they 
made it less attractive for companies established in other Member States to 
exercise this right and they might, in consequence, refrain from acquiring, 
creating or maintaining a subsidiary in the UK. The Court stressed that it 
was sufficient that the rules were capable of restricting the exercise of the 
freedom of establishment and it was not necessary that they actually had the 
effect of leading some companies to refrain from acquiring, creating or 
maintaining a subsidiary in another Member State. 
 
7.4 Aspects of EU law in the preparatory 
work 
As mentioned in the introduction chapter,179 the Swedish rules on interest 
deduction limitations were criticised for not being compatible with EU law 
during the legislative process. As a matter of fact, neither the proposal of the 
Swedish Tax Agency nor the memorandum of the Ministry of Finance 
contained an analysis from an EU-perspective at all.180 However, in the 
Government Bill such an analysis was included, in which the Swedish 
Government concludes that the rules on interest deduction at issue are not in 
conflict with EU law.181  
 
In the bill, the Swedish Government argues that the rules do not involve the 
application of different rules in comparable situations nor do they involve 
the application of the same rule in different situations. According to the 
Government, the limitation of the deductibility of intra-group interest 
payments applies irrespectively of whether the lending company is resident 
in Sweden or in another Member State. Furthermore, the rules are not 
different in their application in respect of whether the company making the 
deductions has limited or unlimited tax liability in Sweden. It is stressed by 
the Swedish Government that the two complementary rules were not 
introduced due to concerns from an EU perspective. Rather, the incentive 
was to simplify for the companies and make sure that “normal” business 
activities were not obstructed.182  
                                                 
179 See Paragraph 1.1 “Problem background.” 
180 See e.g. Consideration of the Swedish Bar Association regarding Fi2008/4093, issued 
2008-09-01. 
181 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 71. 
182 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 71. 
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Several of the consultive bodies had an opinion contrary to the one of the 
Swedish Government, stressing the fact that the rules did in fact have 
restrictive effects on cross-border movements within the Union.183 In their 
opinion, the Swedish rules had obvious similarities with the German 
legislation at issue in Lankhorst-Hohorst and, according to the reasoning in 
that case, such rules constituted a restriction to the freedom of 
establishment.184 
 
7.5 Swedish case law of relevance 
Owing to the recent introduction into the Swedish law of the rules limiting 
the deductibility of intra-group interest payments, case law of the Swedish 
Courts on the issue is scarce. However, to date, the Council for Advance Tax 
Rulings185 has dealt with the question on two occasions,186 of which one is 
of particular interest from an EU perspective. 
 
7.5.1 The Council for Advance Tax Rulings 
Delivered on 30 November 2009, the advance ruling in question concerned 
interest to be paid by X AB, a Swedish share company, to Company Z, a 
Belgian company member of the same group as X AB.  X AB was planning 
to obtain two loans from the Belgian company for the purposes of acquiring 
shares in two other members of the group, Company Y and Company Å 
respectively. The question referred to the Council was whether X AB would 
be able to deduct interest payments attributable to those loans, considering 
the Swedish rules on interest deduction limitations. 
 
The answer to the referred question was partly dependent on whether the 
rules could be considered as complying with the freedom of establishment. 
In its decision, the Council refers to the Truck Center judgment, which it 
interprets as expressing the view that national legislation complies with the 
freedom of establishment, as long as the Member State in question does not 
tax foreign-source income and non-residents in a less favourable way than 
domestic-source income and residents. From this follows, in the view of the 
Council, that a requirement prescribing that the interest expense is subject to 
tax in the other Member State is not contrary to the freedom of 
establishment. References were in this respect also made to the case ACT 
Group Litigation. The advance ruling has been appealed by the applicant as 
well as the Swedish Tax Agency.187 
 
                                                 
183 See e.g. Consideration of Svenska Bankföreningen, Svenska Fondhandlareföreningen 
and Finansbolagens Förening regarding Fi2008/4093, issued 2008-09-01. 
184 See e.g. Consideration of Svenskt Näringsliv regarding Fi2008/4093, issued 2008-09-29. 
185 In Swedish: “Skatterättsnämnden.” 
186 Advance ruling delivered on 2009-07-06, No 15-09/D and Advance ruling delivered on 
2009-11-30, No 13-09/D. 
187 www.skatterattsnamnden.se/skatterattsnamnden/forhandsbesked/2009/forhandsbesked 
2009/inkomstskattskrantesnurra.5.6704c7931254eefbe718000907.html, visited 2010-01-17. 
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7.5.1.1 Divergent opinions 
 
The decision of the Council for Advance Rulings was, however, not 
unanimous. Dahlberg, Hellenius and Påhlson are, with the concurrence of 
Alfreds, of a divergent opinion regarding the question of whether the rules 
had limiting effects on the freedom of establishment. By referring to the 
cases Lankhorst-Hohorst and Eurowings188, the divergent members of the 
Council stated that, even though the rules did not directly differentiate 
between nationals and non-nationals, in practice, they only affected foreign 
legal subjects, which constituted a hindrance to the freedom of 
establishment. 
 
It is noted by the divergent members that, the Swedish rules on interest 
deduction limitations apply in relation to resident as well as non-resident 
companies. However, as regards interest payments made to resident 
companies, the rules at issue only limit the deductibility of those payments 
if made to companies allowed to deduct dividends paid or legal persons 
exempted from tax, like e.g. municipalities. In the divergent opinion, it is 
therefore concluded that the Swedish rules in the majority of cases will 
affect interest payments to foreign parent companies. Thus, obtaining a loan 
from a company not resident in Sweden may lead to the disadvantage of not 
being able to deduct the interest payments and this in turn means that 
companies may deter from establishing subsidiaries in Sweden or, if the 
receiving company is another subsidiary within the group, other Member 
States with low tax rates. Accordingly, the divergent members concluded 
that the rules constituted a restriction of the freedom of establishment 
prohibited by the Treaty, unless validly justified.  
 
7.6 Analysis 
The cases referred in this chapter express two different lines of reasoning, 
which lead to opposite conclusions in respect of how to determine whether a 
national tax measure complies with the freedom of establishment. In the 
following, I will discuss which line of reasoning that ought to be applicable 
in respect of the Swedish rules regarding limitations of the deductibility of 
interest on certain loans. 
 
7.6.1 The first line of reasoning; not objectively 
comparable situations 
The Council for Advance Tax Rulings interpreted the cases ACT Group 
Litigation and Truck Center as implying that a national tax measure, which 
did not place non-residents in a less-favourable tax position than residents, 
complied with the freedom of establishment. Since the “ten percent”-rule 
was found to apply in the same way to residents as well as non-residents, the 
                                                 
188 C-294/97 Eurowings Luftverkehrs AG [1999] ECR I-7995. 
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Council concluded that the Swedish rules on interest deduction limitations 
did not constitute an obstacle to the freedom of establishment.  However, in 
my opinion, the Council’s interpretation can be questioned, since the Court 
in both cases, in fact, did find the national measures at issue to place non-
residents in a less favourable tax position than residents. In ACT Group 
Litigation, non-residents were placed in a less favourable position since they 
could not benefit from the partial imputation system and in Truck Center 
since withholding taxes were only levied on interest payments to non-
residents. The reason for, that the national rules at issue in the respective 
cases, did not constitute a restriction of the freedom of establishment was 
that the situation of residents and non-residents were considered as not 
objectively comparable – not because the rules applied in the same way to 
both residents and non-residents. 
 
Nevertheless, it is true that the Court of Justice, in the Truck Center 
judgment, noticed that the difference in treatment resulting from the Belgian 
tax legislation at issue did not, for various reasons, necessarily procure an 
advantage for resident companies compared to non-resident companies in 
practice. However, this is, as far as I am concerned, a mere observation of 
the Court and was not the reason that rendered it possible for the Belgian 
state to subject foreigners to special treatment.  
 
Accordingly, the crucial point to why the national measures in ACT Group 
Litigation and Truck Center did not constitute a restriction to the freedom of 
establishment was that residents and non-residents were not in objectively 
comparable situations. Therefore, I will continue to examine whether the 
reasoning in ACT Group Litigation and Truck Center, in respect of how to 
perform the comparability-test, can be transferred to the context of the 
Swedish rules on interest deduction limitations. 
 
7.6.1.1 Distinguishing the ACT Group Litigation case 
In the case ACT Group Litigation, the point of departure for the reasoning of 
the Court of Justice was the position of the United Kingdom in its capacity 
as the state of residence of the company paying the dividends. As far as 
domestic dividends was concerned, the imputation system functioned as 
intended in that it prevented the dividends from being subject to chain 
taxation, nevertheless ensuring the United Kingdom the right to tax the 
profits once. However, in case of outbound dividends, an application of the 
imputation system would result in a transfer of the profits to the tax 
jurisdiction of the shareholder, without being subject to tax in the United 
Kingdom. Based on those differences, the Court concluded that the situation 
of a resident shareholder, receiving dividends from a resident company, was 
not comparable to the situation of a non-resident shareholder, receiving 
dividends from the same company 
 
Provided that the Court’s reasoning in the ACT Group Litigation case could 
be transferred to the context of the Swedish rules regarding interest 
deduction limitations, the upholding of those rules could be vindicated by 
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the fact that non-resident parent companies, which receives interest 
payments from a resident subsidiary, would not be considered as being in a 
situation objectively comparable to that of resident parent companies. 
However, as an initial remark, one should be careful to give too wide a 
meaning to the statements of the Court of Justice. The Court interprets the 
law on a case-by-case basis, wherefore statements in a specific case, 
although general in their wording, not necessarily are valid in other cases 
concerning national measures of another kind or where the relevant 
circumstances differ.  
 
In my opinion, the fact that a state, depending on whether the recipient 
company is resident or not, finds itself in either the position of the state of 
source or in the position of the state of residence, merely describes the basic 
differences between resident and non-resident taxation. If these differences 
were to be generally decisive, then residents and non-resident would never 
be in comparable situations and, as is evident from the Court’s case law, 
such an interpretation is not correct.189 Consequently, the reasoning in ACT 
Group Litigation in terms of the comparability-test can only be applied in 
certain situations, one apparently being the situation of resident and non-
resident shareholders in respect of outbound dividends. Hence, the question 
is whether it can also apply to the situation of parent companies in respect of 
outbound interest payments.  
 
Even though similar at a first glance, there are, as far as I can see, several 
non-trifling differences between the payment of dividends and the payment 
of interest. For instance, the payment of interest reduces the taxable income 
of the paying company, whereas the payment of dividends does not. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the views regarding which state that is 
entitled to exercise its taxing power are different in respect of dividends and 
interest respectively. On the one hand, the general standpoint in 
international tax law, in respect of dividends, ought to be source state 
entitlement, i.e. the state in which territory the profits are generated (the 
principle of territoriality). On the other hand, as regards interest, the general 
standpoint ought to be residence state entitlement, i.e. the state in which the 
creditor is resident (the domicile principle).190 These standpoints are also in 
line with views expressed in the Parent-Subsidiary and the Interest-Royalty 
Directive respectively. Moreover, the Swedish and British rules in question 
do not have the same overall purpose. While the Swedish rules aim to 
prevent tax avoidance, the intention of the British rules is to prevent 
economic double taxation. As a consequence, the rules are designed 
differently, which renders it difficult to make comparisons regarding the 
situations of the taxpayers in relation to the application of these respective 
set of tax rules.  
 
                                                 
189 See Paragraph 6.2.2. 
190 See e.g. Kemmeren, Eric C.C.M. "The Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions – A Re-
thinking of Models”, University of Tilburg Ph.D. Thesis,  2001, p 531 and Weber, Dennis. 
“Tax Avoidance and the EC Treaty Freedoms: A Study of the Limitations under European 
Law to the Prevention of Tax Avoidance”, the Hauge: Kluwer Law, 2005, p. 110-112. 
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In the light of the argumentation above, the reasoning of the Court in ACT 
Group Litigation case, which concerns a dividend imputation system, 
cannot be directly transferred to a situation concerning limitations of the 
deductibility of interest payments. However, the Court has assumed a 
similar position, as in the ACT Group Litigation case, in the Truck Center 
case, which, indeed, is a case concerning outbound interest payments.  
  
7.6.1.2 Distinguishing the Truck Center case 
As described in Paragraph 7.3.2, the Truck Center case concerned Belgian 
tax rules stating that interest paid to a non-resident company was subject to 
withholding tax, whereas interest paid to a resident company was not. The 
Court did not find the rules to restrict the freedom of establishment, as the 
resident and non-resident recipient companies were not in objectively 
comparable situations. Just as in the ACT Group Litigation case, the position 
of the Belgian state served as a starting point for the Court’s argumentation. 
Depending on whether the recipient company was resident in Belgium or 
not, the Belgian state acted either in its capacity as the state of residence or 
in its capacity as the state of source. Furthermore, in the Truck Center case, 
the Court observed two additional reasons to why the situation of a resident 
and a non-resident company is not comparable, namely that the two 
situations gave rise to two different charges, which rested on different legal 
bases and that the situation of residents and non-residents differed in respect 
of the recovery of the tax.  
 
However, even though concerning outbound interest payments, the line of 
argument in Truck Center case is, in my view, not transmissible to a 
situation involving the Swedish rules subject to examination in this thesis. 
Firstly, although withholding taxes are withheld and directly paid by the 
debtor, it is the creditor who is subjected to the tax. Accordingly, in case of 
withholding taxes, the Member States has extended their tax jurisdiction as 
to include non-residents in terms of interest income, which is not the case 
regarding the Swedish rules on interest deduction limitations. Furthermore, 
the events in the Truck Center case date from the time prior to the entering 
into force of the Interest-Royalty Directive. Today, the directive, in 
principle, prohibits national measures involving the levying of withholding 
taxes on interest payments.191  
 
Moreover, the two additional reasons delivered by the Court are not 
convincing. As regards the differences in terms of the recovery of the tax, 
these are, to my mind, only a consequence of the basic differences between 
resident and non-resident taxation. These basic differences are not 
independently decisive, when determining whether a resident and non-
resident are in comparable situations.192 Furthermore, taking the position 
that a resident and a non-resident are in different situations because they are 
taxed on separate legal bases implies that once the legal situations are 
different, even if only to a small extent, the legislator is permitted to treat 
                                                 
191 See Article 1 (1) of the Interest-Royalty Directive. 
192 See Paragraph 7.6.1.1. 
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residents and non-residents completely different. Anyhow, the Swedish tax 
measure at issue does not involve separate legal bases. With that being said, 
I will in the following paragraph continue to examine whether the second 
line of reasoning, which rests upon the cases Lankhorst-Hohorst and Thin 
Cap Group Litigation, is more suitable in respect of the Swedish rules 
regarding interest deduction limitations. 
 
7.6.2 The second line of reasoning; objectively 
comparable situations are at hand 
The cases Lankhorst-Hohorst and Thin Cap Group Litigation concerned 
German and UK thin capitalization rules respectively. Both sets of rules 
prescribed that interest, under certain circumstances, was regarded as covert 
distribution, depriving the paying company the possibility of making 
deductions for the interest paid. The Court, in both cases, concluded that the 
rules constituted a restriction of the freedom of establishment. 
 
The German and UK rules are from several different aspects similar to the 
Swedish rules on interest deduction limitations. Firstly, the aim of the thin 
capitalization rules at issue in both Lankhorst-Hohorst and Thin Cap Group 
Litigation was to prevent the same type of tax planning scheme as the 
Swedish rules aim to prevent, viz. preventing multinational groups from 
transferring profits by arranging for interest payments to be deducted in a 
high or normal tax rate jurisdiction and for the corresponding interest 
receipts to be taxed in a lower rate jurisdiction. Furthermore, all three sets of 
rules seek to prevent this type of tax planning by limiting the deductibility of 
interest payments on loans that have not been taken out based on sound 
business reasons. 
 
Nevertheless, the rules are different in that while the thin capitalization rules 
are limiting the deductibility through a re-characterization of the interest 
payments, the Swedish rules constitute a mere disallowance of interest 
deductions. However, this does not, as I see it, constitute such a difference, 
which precludes the Court’s reasoning in Lankhorst-Hohorst and Thin Cap 
Group Litigation, from being applied in respect of the Swedish rules, since 
the latter rules have the same effect as the former. My conclusion is based 
on the following reasoning. 
 
According to the UK thin capitalization rules in Thin Cap Group Litigation, 
interest was regarded as covert distributions to the extent that the interest 
represented more than a reasonable commercial return on the loan. 
However, interest paid to a non-resident company was always treated as 
distribution, even if the interest was arm’s length. The Swedish rules do not, 
like the UK rules, expressively differentiate between residents and non-
residents, since the “ten percent”-rules applies in the same way in either 
case. However, as can be deduced from Lankhorst-Hohorst case, an express 
differentiation is not necessary in order for a set of rules to be found 
contrary to the freedom of establishment. The German rules in Lankhorst-
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Hohorst regarded interest as covert distribution provided that the receiving 
company was not entitled to corporation tax credit in Germany. Even 
though objective in their application on the surface, the German rules were 
found to, in practice, affect non-residents to a larger extent than residents, as 
the former were deemed not to fulfil the requirement of corporate tax credit 
entitlement. Since a majority of the Swedish resident companies are 
subjected to Swedish corporation tax exceeding ten percent, interest 
payments made to such companies are, in principle, always deductible, 
whereas the same do not necessarily apply to non-resident companies. 
Hence, as the application of the “ten percent”-rule give rise to the same 
effect as the German rules, they ought to constitute a restriction of the 
freedom of establishment in the eyes of EU law. 
 
One might argue that the effect of the Swedish rules is less tangible than the 
one of the German thin capitalization rules. For a company to be entitled to 
corporate tax credit it had to be subject to German corporate taxation (i.e. 
have unlimited liability to tax), resulting in that it was practically impossible 
for all non-residents companies to meet this requirement. Comparatively, a 
requirement, like the one in the Swedish rules, prescribing that the 
corresponding interest income has to be taxed by at least ten percent is only 
affecting some of the non-resident companies, i.e. those resident in low-tax 
jurisdictions. However, the fact that the scope of a tax rule is narrow, 
resulting in that only a few taxpayers would be affected by the application 
of it, is not a fact that, in itself, is capable to render it possible for Member 
States to subject foreigners to special treatment. Furthermore, as the Court 
emphasized in Thin Cap Group Litigation, it is sufficient that the national 
tax measure is capable of restricting the exercise of the freedom of 
establishment and it is not necessary that it actually had the effect of leading 
companies from establishing a subsidiary in another Member State.  
 
The Court of Justice did not provide any substantial information regarding 
why the situations of a resident and a non-resident parent company are 
comparable in respect of interest deduction limitations, but merely 
concluded that a difference in treatment between resident subsidiary 
companies, based on the seat of their parent company, constituted a 
restriction of the freedom of establishment. However, the Court provided 
two circumstances, which did not lead to the conclusion that, if those 
circumstances were at hand, a resident and non-resident company could not 
be objectively compared.  
 
Firstly, in Lankhorst-Hohorst the Court declared that, the fact that not all 
German corporations were entitled to corporation tax credit did not preclude 
the possibility of a resident company being in a situation comparable to the 
one of a non-resident company. This was because the situation of the 
corporations, which were not entitled to corporation tax credit, could not be 
validly compared to that of a company carrying on a business for profits and 
subjected to corporation tax. The German corporations, which were not 
entitled to corporation tax credit, were essentially legal persons governed by 
public law or carrying out business in a specific field. Consequently, the fact 
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that the Swedish rules affect certain resident corporations as well, such as 
municipalities and investment companies, does not preclude that residents 
and non-residents are viewed as being in the same situation. 
 
Secondly, in Thin Cap Group Litigation, the Court stated that the position of 
companies belonging to a multinational group is not necessarily different to 
the situation of companies belonging to a purely domestic group. This 
applies even though tax planning with interest deduction could, in principle, 
only be carried out in a multinational context. Accordingly, even though the 
tax planning practice, which the Swedish rules aim to prevent, is, in 
principle, only feasible in a multinational group, the situation of non-
resident parent companies belonging to such a group is not, in respect of 
interest payments, not different to the one of resident parent companies. 
 
On account to the arguing above, I am bound to agree with the consultive 
bodies and the divergent members of the Council for Advance Tax Ruling 
in that, on the basis of the reasoning in the cases Lankhorst-Horhorst and 
Thin Cap Group Litigation, the Swedish rules on interest deduction 
limitations appears to be in breach of the freedom of establishment. It might 
be added that the case Eurowings,193 referred to by the divergent members 
of the Council for Advance Tax Ruling, supports such a standpoint, as the 
reasoning in that case is very similar to the one in both Lankhorst-Horhorst 
and Thin Cap Group Litigation.  
 
7.7 Conclusion 
The conclusion is that the Swedish rules on limitations of the deductibility 
of intra-group interest payments are in breach of Articles 49 and 54 TFEU 
on the freedom of establishment. Even though the rules appear to be 
objective in their application, they have the effect of affecting only non-
resident parent companies with resident subsidiaries. Since the situation of 
such companies is objectively comparable to the one of resident parent 
companies with resident subsidiaries, special treatment is prohibited.  
 
The conclusion above rests primarily upon the reasoning of the Court of 
Justice in the cases Lankhorst-Horhorst and Thin Cap Group Litigation. The 
reasoning in those cases is suited to be transferred to the context of the 
Swedish rules, as they aim to prevent the same type of tax planning using 
the same method. 
 
The reasoning in the cases ACT Group Litigation and Truck Center can be 
distinguished from being applicable in the context of the Swedish rules, 
since it concerns tax measures of a different kind and with a different aim. 
                                                 
193 The case is not referred in detail, as it concerns the freedom to provide services. 
Therefore, Lankhorst-Horhorst and Thin Cap Group Litigation, which concern the freedom 
of establishment, therefore stood out as the two better cases to refer in a more extensive 
way. 
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8 Grounds of Justification 
8.1 Overview 
A national measure found to be in breach of the freedom of establishment 
can still be upheld, if there is a valid justification ground applicable. This 
chapter contains a description of the different justification grounds 
recognised by EU law, as they appear in the Treaty as well as those 
developed in the case law of the Court of Justice.  
 
8.2 Justification grounds in the Treaty 
Article 52 TFEU (ex Article 46 TEC) provides an express possibility to the 
Member States to apply provisions in its national legislation that constitute 
derogation from the freedom of establishment. According to the Article in 
question, foreign nationals can be subjected to different treatment, on 
condition that the different treatment is motivated by public policy, public 
security or public health. Article 52 TFEU is applicable to all kinds of 
obstacles to the freedom of establishment, i.e. both directly and indirectly 
discriminatory measures as well as restrictions.194 
 
The Court has from the outset stressed that the exceptions contained in 
Article 52 TFEU must be interpreted strictly, so that their scope cannot be 
determined unilaterally by each Member State without being subject to any 
control by the European Union’s institutions. Those situations, where a tax 
measure would fall within the material scope of Article 52 TFEU, ought to 
be rare and, to date; there are no cases where the Court of Justice has 
justified national tax rules in breach of the freedom of establishment on the 
ground of this Article.195  
 
8.3 The rule-of-reason doctrine 
In its case law, the Court has introduced new grounds for justifying 
obstacles to the fundamental freedoms into what has become known as the 
rule-of-reason doctrine.196 In the Gebhard197 case, the Court has specified 
four necessary requirements for an obstacle in the national legislation of a 
Member State to be justified. Firstly, the national measure has to be applied 
                                                 
194 Hilling, Maria. “Free movement and Tax Treaties in the Internal Market”, Uppsala: 
Iustus Förlag, 2005, p. 95. 
195 Ståhl, Kristina and Roger Persson Österman. ”EG-skatterätt”, Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 
2006, p. 142. 
196 Dahlberg, Mattias. “Direct Taxation in Relation to the Freedom of establishment and the 
Free Movement of Capital”, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 118. 
197 C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell' Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano 
[1995] ECR I-4165. 
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in a non-discriminatory manner. Secondly, it must be justified by imperative 
requirements in the general interest. Thirdly, the measure must be suitable 
for securing the attainment of the objective that it pursues and, finally, not 
go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (the principle of 
proportionality).198 The general standpoint in literature is that a justification 
ground, which has developed as part of the rule-of-reason doctrine, does not 
apply in relation to direct discrimination. A literal interpretation of the first 
requirement outlined above supports such a standpoint.199 However, with 
reference to the Court’s case law, it is evident that the rule-of-reason 
doctrine applies in relation to indirect discrimination.200  
 
As regards indirect discriminatory and restrictive tax measures, a number of 
grounds of justifications have been put forward before the Court of Justice. 
However, only the Court has only accepted a handful of those grounds, 
which will be examined in the following paragraphs. 
 
8.3.1 Effectiveness of fiscal control 
The Court of Justice has, at least in principle, accepted the need of an 
effective fiscal control as a valid justification ground. In practice, no tax rule 
has hitherto been justified on this ground, although recognised as a possible 
ground of justification in i.a. the case Futura Participations.201 In the 
Futura Participations case Luxembourgian tax rules, which required 
branches to keep an extra set of accounts in order to carry losses forward, 
could be justified by the need of an effective fiscal control. In the view of 
the Court, the accounts kept by the “principal company” in its home state 
did not guarantee that the Luxembourgian Tax Authorities were provided 
with sufficient information in order to make a correct tax assessment in 
respect of the branch.  
 
However, the Court did not find the Luxembourgian rules to be 
proportional, as they required the accounts to be kept in compilation with 
Luxembourgian law. The Court held that it was sufficient that the taxpayer 
in question was able to demonstrate the losses he sought to carry forward in 
a clear and precise way and that it was not essential that the means, by 
which he demonstrated it, were limited to those provided for by 
Luxembourg law.202 The Court also referred to the possibility of exchanging 
                                                 
198 C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell' Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano 
[1995] ECR I-4165, para. 32. 
199 Dahlberg, Mattias. “Direct Taxation in Relation to the Freedom of establishment and the 
Free Movement of Capital”, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 120. 
200 See e.g. C-204/90 Bachmann v Belgian State [1992] ECR 1-249 (referred to in more 
detail in Paragraph 8.3.3) and C-300/90 Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-305.  
201 C-250/95 Futura Participation SA & Singer v Administration des Contributions 
(Luxembourg) [1997] ECR I-2471. 
202 C-250/95 Futura Participation SA & Singer v Administration des Contributions 
(Luxembourg) [1997] ECR I-2471, paras. 40-43. 
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information between tax authorities according to the Mutual Assistance 
Directive.203 
 
In several subsequent cases, the Court has found national measures, with the 
objective to consolidate the effectiveness of fiscal control, not required or 
that they did not meet the test of proportionality. The Court is also stressing 
that the Mutual Assistance Directive generally provides the Member States 
with sufficient tools to exchange necessary information. Furthermore, it has 
been argued that this ground of justification is not, in itself, capable of 
justifying material tax rules, but is only certain procedural requirements, 
like the burden and level of proof.204 
 
8.3.2 The principle of territoriality 
The Futura Participatations205 case also introduced the fiscal principle of 
territoriality as a ground of justification. The Court of Justice concluded 
that the principle of territoriality justified the requirement under 
Luxembourgian law prescribing that losses incurred by a branch of a foreign 
company, in order to be carried forward, had to be attributable to the branch 
state.206 The Court, in the subsequent Bosal Holding207 case, narrowed the 
scope of the principle, stating that the territoriality defence was limited to 
situations involving one taxpayer and one type of tax only.208  
 
However, in the Marks & Spencer209 case, concerning cross border group 
relief, the principle reappeared in a situation involving two taxpayers. On 
condition that the rules were proportionate, the Court accepted the principle 
to justify British rules that excluded (non-definite) losses of foreign 
subsidiaries from attribution to a domestic parent company, even though 
losses of domestic subsidiaries could be so transferred.210 The Court has in 
the case N. v Inspecteur211 confirmed the reasoning put forward in Marks & 
Spencer.212 
 
                                                 
203 Council Directive 77/799/EEC of 19 December 1977 concerning mutual assistance by 
the competent authorities of the Member States in the field of direct taxation. 
204 Ståhl, Kristina and Roger Persson Österman. ”EG-skatterätt”, Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 
2006, p. 147. 
205 C-250/95 Futura Participation SA & Singer v Administration des Contributions 
(Luxembourg) [1997] ECR I-2471. 
206 C-250/95 Futura Participation SA & Singer v Administration des Contributions 
(Luxembourg) [1997] ECR I-2471, paras. 20-22. 
207 C-168/01 Bosal Holding BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financien [2003] ECR I-9409. 
208 C-168/01 Bosal Holding BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financien [2003] ECR I-9409, 
paras. 38-39. 
209 C-446/03 Marks & Spencer v Hasley (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-
10837. 
210 C-446/03 Marks & Spencer v Hasley (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-
10837, para. 39. 
211 C-470/04 N v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor Alelo [2005] ECR, I-
7409. 
212 C-470/04 N v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor Alelo [2005] ECR, I-
7409, paras. 41-42. 
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8.3.3 Fiscal coherence 
Coherence of the fiscal system is another ground of justification that has 
been accepted by the Court. Fiscal coherence as a justification ground first 
appeared in the Bachmann213 case. The case concerned Belgian tax rules 
allowing a deduction of payments for life insurance contracts, under 
condition that the payments were made to a Belgian insurer. Mr Bachman 
was a German national working in Belgium. Mr Bachman was insured by a 
German insurer, wherefore the Belgian Tax Authorities denied him to 
deduct his insurance contributions.214  
 
The Court argued that since natural persons would normally take out 
insurance in the state of residence, natural persons working in Belgium but 
resident in another Member State would be indirectly discriminated against, 
as they were not allowed to deduct such insurance contributions.215 The 
Court then went on to examine whether the rules could be justified. It found 
that the deductibility of insurance contributions was linked to the liability to 
tax on sums paid out by the insurer under pension and life insurances. The 
sums paid out were, according to Belgian law, exempted from tax if there 
had been no deductions of contributions. It could therefore be justified, on 
the ground of the need to preserve fiscal coherence, to deny Mr Bachmann a 
deduction for his insurance contributions, as the sums payable on his 
German insurance would not be taxable in Belgium.216 
 
If interpreted broadly, the Bachmann case implies a total upholding of the 
principle of reciprocity, i.e. that deductions in computing income are 
possible only if the corresponding payments are taxable within the same tax 
jurisdiction.217 However, as is evident from subsequent cases on the matter, 
such broad interpretation is not correct, as the Court has since emphasized 
the importance of an existing direct link between the deduction of e.g. 
insurance contributions and the taxation of the payable sums from that 
insurance.218 The scope of the fiscal cohesion defence has been sized down 
further by the cases Wielockx219 and Verkooijen220, from which follows that 
the application of fiscal coherence as a ground of justification presupposes 
that the tax rules at issue only concerns one type of tax as well as only one 
tax subject.221 
 
                                                 
213 C-204/90 Bachmann v Belgian State [1992] ECR 1-249. 
214 C-204/90 Bachmann v Belgian State [1992] ECR 1-249, para. 10. 
215 C-204/90 Bachmann v Belgian State [1992] ECR 1-249, para. 9. 
216 C-204/90 Bachmann v Belgian State [1992] ECR 1-249, para. 28.  
217 Knobbe-Keuk, Brigitte. “Restrictions on the Fundamental Freedoms Enshrined in the 
EC Treaty by Discriminatory Tax Provisions – Ban and Justification” in EC Tax Review 
3/1994, p. 72. 
218 Dahlberg, Mattias. “Direct Taxation in Relation to the Freedom of establishment and the 
Free Movement of Capital”, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 131. 
219 C-80/94 Wielockx [1995] ECR I-2493. 
220 C-35/98 Staatssecretaris van Financiën v BGM Verkooijen [2000] ECR I-4071. 
221 Terra, Ben J.M. and Peter J. Wattel. “European Tax Law”, Amsterdam: Kluwer Law, 
2008, p. 765. 
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8.3.4 Balanced allocation of taxing power 
The case Marks & Spencer222, mentioned in Paragraph 8.3.2 on the 
principle of territoriality, also introduced the need to preserve a balanced 
allocation of taxing power as a valid justification ground. The Court of 
Justice stated: 
 
45. (…) the preservation of the allocation of the power to impose taxes between 
Member States might make it necessary to apply to the economic activities of 
companies established in one of those States only the tax rules of that State in 
respect of both profits and losses. 
 
46. In effect, to give companies the option to have their losses taken into account 
in the Member State in which they are established or in another Member State 
would significantly jeopardise a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes 
between Member States, as the taxable basis would be increased in the first State 
and reduced in the second to the extent of the losses transferred. 
  
The concept of balanced allocation of taxing power is, according to Terra 
and Wattel, closely linked with both the principle of territoriality and fiscal 
cohesion, making this ground of justification rather impalpable. In their 
opinion, the concept in question refers to the legitimate need of tax 
connecting factors, resulting in a match of tax base reductions and 
corresponding increases within the same jurisdiction. The close connection 
to the territoriality principle implies source country over resident country 
entitlement.223 
 
8.3.5 Prevention of abuse 
The Court of Justice has also accepted loss of tax revenues due to abusive 
measures on behalf of the taxpayer, such as tax avoidance and tax evasion, 
as a valid ground of justification.224 The case ICI plc v Colomer225 
concerned a British tax measure, which allowed joint venture subsidiaries to 
carry over losses to their parent companies, under condition that the British 
parent was wholly or mainly holding shares in subsidiaries resident in the 
United Kingdom. The Court of Justice found the rules to be in breach of the 
freedom of establishment. The United Kingdom Government argued that the 
rules at issue were designed to prevent members of a consortium from 
directing losses of non-resident subsidiaries to resident ones, making the UK 
a loss dumping ground. Furthermore, the rules aimed, as the other side of 
                                                 
222 C-446/03 Marks & Spencer v Hasley (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) [2005] ECR I-
10837. 
223 Terra, Ben J.M. and Peter J. Wattel. “European Tax Law”, Amsterdam: Kluwer Law, 
2008, p. 768. 
224 Pistone, Pasquale. “European direct tax law; que vadis?” in Accounting and Taxation 
& Assessment of ECJ Case Law , edited by Michael Lang and Frans Vanistendael. 
Amsterdam: EATLP International Tax Law Series, 2008. Accessible through: 
http://www.eatlp.org/uploads/public/Pistone%20European%20direct%20tax%20law%20qu
o%20vadis%20-%20version%203.pdf, visited 2010-01-08. 
225 C-264/96 ICI plc v Colomer [1998] ECR I-469. 
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the same coin, to prevent profits of resident subsidiaries to be accrued to 
non-resident subsidiaries, thereby escaping taxation in the UK.226 
 
While examining the rules, the Court found that they did not have the 
specific purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements, set up to 
circumvent the UK tax legislation, from attracting tax benefits. Rather, the 
rules applied generally to all situations in which the majority of the 
subsidiaries of the consortium were established abroad – irrespectively of 
the reasons why. The Court emphasized the fact that the establishment of a 
subsidiary outside the United Kingdom did not, in itself, necessarily 
constitute tax avoidance, since the company will in any event be subject to 
the tax legislation of the state of establishment.227 
 
To summarize, the following conditions, for a national measure to constitute 
an anti-abuse measure capable to justify free movement restrictions, can be 
deduced from the Court argumentation. Firstly, the measure has to 
specifically target wholly artificial arrangements. Secondly, it may not be 
general in its application in that it covers anti-avoidance schemes as well as 
transactions motivated by sound reasons from a business economic point of 
view. Thirdly, the establishment of a company in another Member State 
does not entail tax avoidance per se. Furthermore, the measure must, of 
course, also comply with the proportionality test.228 
                                                 
226 C-264/96 ICI plc v Colomer [1998] ECR I-469, para. 23 – 25. 
227 C-264/96 ICI plc v Colomer [1998] ECR I-469, para. 26 
228 Dahlberg, Mattias. “Direct Taxation in Relation to the Freedom of establishment and the 
Free Movement of Capital”, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2005, p. 240. 
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9 The Swedish Rules and Possible 
Grounds of Justification 
9.1 Overview 
As concluded in Chapter 7, the Swedish legislation on limitations of the 
deductibility of intra-group interest payments is in breach of the freedom of 
establishment. In this Chapter, I will address the second and third question 
required to achieve the purpose of this thesis: 
 
• Is there a valid ground of justification curing the breach?  
 
• If validly justified, are the rules proportionate? 
 
9.2 Approaching the problem 
The Swedish rules on interest deduction limitation in Chapter 24, 
Paragraphs 10a – 10e of the Swedish Income Tax Act were found to 
constitute a limitation of the freedom of establishment since they were 
found to affect non-resident companies to a greater extent than resident 
companies.229 However, the rules may still be applied, provided that they 
can be justified by an overriding public interest recognised by EU law.230 
Furthermore, the rules have to meet the requirements of proportionality, 
meaning that the rules have to be suitable to obtain the objective for which 
they were adopted as well as not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain that objective.231 
 
The Swedish rules at issue aim to prevent the use of a certain type of tax 
planning, involving intra-group tax planning with interest deductions.232 
The scope of the general rules in Chapter 24, Paragraph 10b – 10c of the 
Swedish Income Tax Act extends to certain types of loan situations, 
identified by the Swedish Tax Agency as being frequently used in the set up 
of such tax planning practices that the rules aim to prevent. The textbook 
example of such a loan situation is the financing of an acquisition of shares 
in an affiliated company with an intra-group loan.233 
 
The purpose of the two complementary rules in Chapter 24, Paragraph 10d – 
10e of the Swedish Income Tax Act is to preclude transactions, which are 
not performed for tax reasons only, from the application of the interest 
deduction prohibition. According to the “ten percent”-rule, interest paid on 
                                                 
229 See Paragraph 7.7.  
230 See Paragraph 8.1. 
231 See Paragraph 8.3. 
232 See Paragraph 2.1. 
233 See Paragraph 3.3. 
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loans where the corresponding interest income is taxed at a minimum rate of 
ten percent is always deductible. If the corresponding interest income is 
taxed at a lower rate, interest paid is still deductible provided that the 
transaction, i.e. the loan as well as the acquisition, is principally business 
motivated, meaning that the businesslike reasons have to amount to 75 
percent.234 The burden of proof in respect of whether any of the 
complementary rules apply is, in principle, born by the taxpayer, save where 
the taxpayer in question is an investment company.235 
 
9.2.1 Possible grounds of justification 
applicable in the present case 
The Treaty, in Article 52 TFEU provides an express possibility to the 
Member States to apply provisions in its national legislation that constitute a 
limitation of the freedom of establishment. However, the Article in question 
is restrictive in its application and has, to date, never justified national tax 
rules, which are contrary to the freedom of establishment.236 Against this 
background, it is highly unlikely that the Swedish legislation on limitations 
of the deductibility of intra-group interest deductions is justified by virtue of 
Article 52 TFEU. Accordingly, possible justification grounds remain to be 
found in the Court’s rule of reason doctrine.  
 
As regards coherence of the fiscal system237, the scope of this defence is 
limited to one-tax-one-subject-situations only. For that reason, it cannot be 
applied in the present case, since the Swedish rules involve two different tax 
subjects; the borrowing company and the lending company. Furthermore, 
the benefit of being able to deduct interest expenses in Sweden is not 
directly linked to the disadvantage of being taxed on the corresponding 
interest income. Quite the reverse, the Swedish legislation, in principle, does 
not contain a requirement that the corresponding interest income is taxed at 
the level of the receiver.  
 
Considering that, the Swedish rules were introduced for the purposes of 
combating a certain type of tax planning, it lies near at hand to plead the 
need to prevent abuse238 defence. According to the preparatory work, the 
rules aim to prevent a specific tax planning scheme with interest deductions 
set up to circumvent the Swedish legislation for the purposes of attaining 
more favourable tax treatment. Accordingly, at first glance, the need to 
prevent abuse appears to be a possible ground of justification, but in order to 
make a definitive conclusion the issue has to be investigated further (see 
below).  
 
                                                 
234 See Paragraph 3.3. 
235 See Paragraph 3.5. 
236 See Paragraph 8.2. 
237 See Paragraph 8.3.3. 
238 See Paragraph 8.3.5. 
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As mentioned in Paragraph 8.3.1, the Court has hitherto not justified a 
material tax rule due to the need to ensure an effective fiscal control239 and 
there is no reason to believe it would apply in respect of the Swedish rules 
regarding interest deduction limitations, as their application does not 
primarily lead to tax assessment entanglements. However, argumentation on 
an effectiveness of fiscal control basis may lead to the justification of certain 
procedural requirements, like i.e. the burden of proof. 
 
It can be argued that the Swedish rules on interest deduction limitations may 
be justified on the basis of the principle of territoriality240, as their aim is to 
prevent resident subsidiaries from transferring their profits abroad by means 
of interest deductions. However, in situations involving abuse, the 
territoriality defence normally gives way to the prevention of abuse defence, 
as the latter provides an opportunity to deal with the intent of the taxpayer. 
The same reasoning applies in respect of the need to preserve a balanced 
allocation of taxing power,241 considering the close connection between this 
ground of justification and the principle of territoriality.242 
 
9.3 Relevant case law of the Court of 
Justice on abuse 
As concluded in the previous paragraph, the need to prevent abuse may 
justify the application of the Swedish rules on interest deduction limitations. 
In order to be able to examine this further, three cases from the Court of 
concerning abuse will be referred in the following paragraphs. The cases are 
referred only in so far as they concern the question regarding justification 
and proportionality. 
 
9.3.1 C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst 
The case Lankhorst-Hohorst concerned German thin capitalization rules that 
were found to be in breach of the freedom of establishment provisions.243 
As regards possible grounds of justification, the German Government 
argued that the thin capitalization rules could be justified by the overriding 
interest in the public interest to prevent abuse of tax law.244 The government 
in question submitted that the national measure at issue was intended to 
combat tax evasion through the financing of a subsidiary through a loan 
instead of capital contributions, thereby transferring the profit of the 
                                                 
239 See Paragraph 8.3.1. 
240 See Paragraphs 8.3.2. 
241 See Paragraph 8.3.4. 
242 Terra, Ben J.M. and Peter J. Wattel. “European Tax Law”, Amsterdam: Kluwer Law, 
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subsidiary to the parent in the form of interest, which, contrary to dividends, 
is deductible in calculating the subsidiaries profit.  
 
The Court of Justice noted that the German thin capitalization rules did not 
have the specific purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements, but 
applied generally to any situation in which the parent company had its seat, 
for whatever reason, in a Member State other than Germany. The Court 
concluded that the fact that the parent had its seat abroad did not, in itself, 
entail a risk of tax evasion, since the parent would in any event be subject to 
the tax legislation in its state of residence. Moreover, no abuse on behalf of 
the Lankhorst group had been proven in the case, as the loan obtained by 
Lankohorst-Hohorst did, in fact, result in reducing the company’s interest 
burden. 
 
9.3.2 C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes 
The case Cadbury Schweppes concerns a UK group, which for the purposes 
of raising and provide finance to other subsidiaries in the group had set up 
two subsidiaries in Ireland. The profits made by the Irish subsidiaries were 
subject to tax at 10 percent under the rules then applicable to companies 
established in the International Financial Services Centre in Dublin, the so-
called IFSC-regime. The UK applied its CFC-legislation and taxed the UK 
parent for the profit of the subsidiaries on an arising basis as if it were a 
branch, crediting the corporation tax paid in Ireland.  
 
The Court of Justice, after concluding that the CFC-rules constituted a 
restriction on the freedom of establishment, looked into the question of 
whether the rules could be justified by the need to prevent tax avoidance. It 
was agreed by the parties that the subsidiaries in Ireland were set up to 
enable the profit from the intra-group financing transactions to benefit from 
the low tax regime in Ireland. However, whereas the UK Government 
argued that the subsidiaries were solely incorporated to avoid UK taxation, 
the Cadbury Schweppes group maintained that the subsidiaries conducted a 
commercial business of raising and lending money.  
 
The Court stated that, although appreciating that the subsidiaries were 
controlled as well as benefiting from a special low tax regime, the 
establishment of the two subsidiaries did not constitute abuse as long as they 
where not wholly artificial arrangements. As regards the question of how to 
determine whether an establishment is wholly artificial or not, the Court 
held that an establishment is to be regarded as genuine where, based on an 
evaluation of objective factors which are ascertainable by third parties. 
According to the Court, such objective factors constituted of particular 
evidence of physical existence in terms of premises, staff and equipment, 
i.e. an actual establishment carrying on genuine economic activities and not 
a mere "letterbox" or "front" subsidiary. Furthermore, the national measure 
has to have the objective of specifically targeting such artificial arrangement 
as well as being suitable to achieve that objective. 
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The Court found the rules to be suitable for achieving their objective, 
namely the rules made it possible to thwart practises, which hade no purpose 
other than to escape the tax normally due on profits generated by activities 
carried on in the territory of the Member State in question. The UK CFC-
legislation contained a number of exceptions where taxation of the resident 
company on the profit of the CFC did not apply. Accordingly, the taxpayers 
had the opportunity to provide information to the tax authorities, which 
excluded them from application of the CFC-rules. For instance, some of the 
exceptions exempted the resident company in situations in which the 
existence of a wholly artificial arrangement appeared to be excluded, e.g. if 
the CFC distributed a large part of its profit to the UK parent or if it 
performed trading activities.  
 
If none of the exceptions were found to apply, a so-called motive test was 
performed. The UK parent then had to show that the CFC had not been 
established for the main purpose of achieving tax benefits. The Court of 
Justice left to the national court to decide whether the motive test could be 
interpreted as singling out artificial arrangements only. If the test did single 
out artificial arrangements only, the rules were justified by the need to 
prevent abuse.  
 
9.3.3 C-524/04 Thin Cap Group Litigation 
The case Thin Cap Group Litigation concerned British thin capitalization 
rules, which were found to be in breach of Articles 49 and 54 TFEU.245 The 
UK Government held that the rules could be justified by the need to prevent 
abuse.246 It submitted that, contrary to the German legislation at issue in 
Lankhorst-Hohorst, the UK thin capitalization rules were targeted at a 
particular form of tax avoidance designed to circumvent the tax legislation 
in the state of residence of the borrowing company. The rules provided that 
interest paid to a company belonging to the same group was treated as 
distribution only if, and only so far as, it exceeded what would have been 
agreed between those companies on an arm’s length basis.  
 
The Court agreed and stated that the legislation at issue was, in principle, an 
appropriate means of attaining the objective underlying its adoption. 
Furthermore, the Court held that the “arm’s lengths”-test constituted an 
objective element, which could be independently verified, when determining 
whether a transaction constituted, in whole or in part, a wholly artificial 
arrangement. National legislation, containing such objective and verifiable 
elements, were not considered as going beyond what was necessary on 
                                                 
245 The facts of the case is referred to in more detail in Paragraph 7.3.1.4. 
246 The British Government also argued that the rules could be justified by the need of fiscal 
cohesion, as the national legislation, through DTCs that had been entered into, ensured that 
any increase in the taxable profit due to the application of the thin capitalization rules was 
offset by a corresponding reduction in the taxable profit of the lender in the state in which it 
is resident. However, the Court of Justice declared that the fiscal cohesion defence could 
not be applied in such situations. 
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condition that it fulfilled two conditions.  Firstly, the taxpayer had to be 
given, without being subject to undue administrative constrains, the 
opportunity to provide evidence of commerciality of the transaction and, 
secondly, the re-characterisation of interest paid as a distribution had to be 
limited to the proportion of that interest exceeding arm’s length commercial 
terms. Accordingly, although constituting a restriction of the freedom of 
establishment, the application of the UK thin capitalisation rules could be 
justified by need to prevent abuse. Furthermore, the rules fulfilled the 
requirements of proportionality. 
  
9.4 The Commission’s Communication on 
anti-abuse measures 
The Commission has issued a Communication247on the application of anti-
abuse measures in the area of direct taxation. The purpose is to provide the 
Member State with information of how to , in the Commission’s opinion, 
strike a proper balance between the public interest of combating abuse and 
the need to avoid disproportionate restrictions on cross-border activity 
within the EU. The Communication principally contains an analysis of the 
principles flowing from the relevant case law of the Court of Justice.248 A 
large part of the contents of the Communication has already bean dealt with 
in the previous paragraphs of this chapter, e.g. that tax avoidance rules must 
target wholly artificial arrangements only and the criteria differentiating 
such arrangements from those carrying out economic activities which are 
genuine. However, some of the content shed some new light on the issue. 
For instance, by referring to AG Geelhoed’s opinion in Thin Cap Group 
Litigation, the Commission declares that: 
 
“…the setting out of certain reasonable presumptive criteria contributes to a 
balanced application of national anti-abuse measures as it is in the interests of 
both legal certainty for taxpayers, and workability for tax authorities.” 249 
 
Furthermore, the real and subjective intentions of the taxpayer can only be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, wherefore the entire burden of proof 
should be born by the taxpayer. Moreover, in the view of the Commission, 
increases of the taxable income due to the application of anti-avoidance 
rules should be limited to the extent that is attributable to the purely 
artificial arrangement.250 
 
 
                                                 
247 COM (2007) 785 final. “The application of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct 
taxation – within the EU and in relation to third countries.” 
248 COM (2007) 785 final. “The application of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct 
taxation – within the EU and in relation to third countries”, p. 2. 
249 Opinion of AG Geelhoed in C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation 
v Commissioners of Inland Revenue [2007] ECR I-2107, para. 66. 
250 COM (2007) 785 final. “The application of anti-abuse measures in the area of direct 
taxation – within the EU and in relation to third countries”, p. 5. 
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9.5 Aspects of EU law in the preparatory 
work 
Since the Swedish Government is of the opinion that the rules on interest 
deduction limitations are not in conflict with EU law, the legislative bill 
does not provide much information in respect of the Government’s view 
regarding possible grounds of justification as well as regarding the 
proportionality of the rules from an EU perspective.251 However, the 
Government stresses that the scope of the rules is very narrow, as their 
application, in principle, is limited to intra-group acquisitions financed 
through internal loans. Furthermore, most interest payments on such loans 
are deductible on the basis of the “ten percent”-rule. The Swedish 
Government concluded that, in order to prevent tax avoidance, cause was 
given for high demands on the transaction being business motivated.252 
 
The consultive bodies are primarily arguing, by referring to the case Thin 
Cap Group253, that the rules are not proportionate, as they are not targeting 
purely artificial arrangements only. However, the rules would fit the 
proportionality requirements if the word principally was removed from the 
wording of the second complementary rule in Chapter 24, Paragraph 10e of 
the Swedish Income Tax Act. The consultive bodies held that, in its present 
wording, the rules in question applied to business-motivated transactions if 
they were not business-motivated enough.254 
 
9.6 The Council for Advance Tax Rulings 
The Council for Advance Tax Rulings decided, in its advance ruling of 30 
November 2009, that the Swedish rules regarding interest deduction 
limitations complied with the freedom of establishment. Consequently, the 
Council did not have to examine the question of whether the rules could be 
justified.255 However, the members of the Council having a divergent 
opinion state that the rule could be justified on the ground of the need to 
prevent abuse, but in their current design, the rules are not proportionate, as 
they are not targeting purely artificial arrangements only. The divergent 
members refer on this part to the cases Cadbury Schweppes and Thin Cap 
Group Litigation.256 
 
                                                 
251 See Paragraph 7.4. 
252 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p 68. 
253 See Paragraph 9.3.3. 
254 Government Bill 2008/09:65, p. 66. 
255 See Paragraph 7.5.1. 
256 Advance ruling delivered on 2009-07-06, No 15-09/D and Advance ruling delivered on 
2009-11-30, No 13-09/D. 
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9.7 Analysis 
In the following, I will discuss whether the Swedish rules regarding 
limitations of the deductibility of intra-group interest payments can be 
justified and whether they are proportional. Since the question of 
proportionality to a large extent concurs with, or at least is enclosed within, 
the question of justification, these two questions will be jointly dealt with. 
 
In order for national tax rules, which have been found contrary to EU law, to 
be justified by need to prevent abuse, the rules have to have the objective to 
prevent specific abusive measures. As already concluded in Paragraph 
9.2.1, the Swedish rules regarding limitations of the deductibility of intra-
group interest payments do have such a purpose, as they aim to prevent a 
certain type of tax planning based on the unlimited deductibility of interest. 
However, a justification also requires that the rules are suitable for securing 
the attainment of the objective that they pursue. Moreover, the rules also 
have to be proportionate, in that they do not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to attain the objective in question.  
 
Contrary to what might be inferred from the Lankhorst-Hohorst ruling, the 
Court in Thin Cap Group Litigation held that thin capitalization rules, in 
principle, were effective as a tool in preventing the diversion of profits. As 
discussed in Paragraph 7.6.2, the Swedish rules on interest deduction 
limitations aim to prevent the same type of tax planning as the rules at issue 
in Lankhorst-Hohorst and Thin Cap Group Litigation. Furthermore, the 
means by which such tax planning is thwarted are the same as well, i.e. 
limiting the deductibility of interest expenses. Considering this one can 
conclude, that tax planning with interest deduction constitutes such an 
abusive measure whose prevention may justify the application of rules, 
which are otherwise prohibited as they are contemplated as contrary to EU 
law. Moreover, one can expect the method of prevention contained in the 
Swedish rules to be accepted, in principle, as a suitable means to combat 
such tax planning practices.  
 
Nevertheless, as the Court has held on numerous occasions, anti-avoidance 
rules are only compatible with EC law in so far as they apply to purely 
artificial arrangements entered into for tax reasons alone. In order to 
differentiate the wholly artificial arrangements from the ones motivated by 
business reasons, the Swedish rules allows interest to be deducted in cases 
where the transaction in question either falls within the scope of the “ten 
percent”-rule or is principally business motivated.  
 
With reference to the Court’s statements in respect of the British rules at 
issue in Cadbury Schweppes, the “ten percent”-rule ought to qualify as 
“…an objective element which can be independently verified in order to 
determine whether the transaction in question represents, in whole or in part, 
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a purely artificial arrangement.”257 Accordingly, the “ten percent”-rule 
contributes to, as AG Geelhoed pointed out in his opinion in Thin Cap 
Group Litigation, legal certainty for taxpayers as well as a more workable 
and efficient tax assessment. Furthermore, the threshold of ten percent is, as 
I see it, a reasonable criterion, as the incentives of setting up tax planning 
practices with interest deduction ought to be substantially reduced in case 
the recipient company is subject to a tax rate higher than that. 
 
However, as is evident from the Court’s case law, rules that distinguish on 
the basis of presumptive criteria only, no matter how reasonable they may 
be, do not meet the test of proportionality, as the taxpayers must be given 
the opportunity to overthrow the presumption. The second complementary 
rule contained in the Swedish rules, stating that interest is still deductible on 
condition that the transaction is principally business motivated, does provide 
the taxpayers with such an opportunity. The rule in question has obvious 
similarities with the motive test contained in the British CFC-legislation at 
issue in Cadbury Schweppes. In Cadbury Schweppes, the Court declared 
that the British CFC-rules could only be justified by the need to prevent 
abuse on condition that the motive test could be interpreted as singling out 
wholly artificial arrangements only. Hence, the question is whether the 
Swedish rule, requiring the transaction to be principally business motivated, 
excludes wholly artificial arrangement only.  
 
According to statements in the preparatory work, the expression principally 
business motivated extends to transactions, where the businesslike reasons 
are clearly superior to any other reasons to perform the transaction, such as 
appropriating oneself tax benefits. Hence, even though subject to critic, the 
expression business motivated in the wording of the rules is used as a 
diametrical opposite to the expression motivated by tax reasons. In order for 
a transaction to be classified as principally business motivated, the 
businesslike reasons have to amount to 75 percent.258 In the government bill 
it is advocated that the degree of business likeness is determined through an 
overall assessment of all relevant circumstances. However, the government 
bill does not offer any explicit guidance on the criteria of how to determine 
and quantify the level of commerciality.259 
 
The use of the expression business motivated as signifying the complete 
opposite to tax motivated is not entirely in accordance with the usage of 
those expressions within EU law. In Cadbury Schweppes, the Court of 
Justice expressively confirmed that it is quite legitimate for tax 
considerations to play a role in the decision on e.g. where to establish a 
subsidiary. The Court held that, the objective to minimize the total 
expenditure, including tax expenses, was in itself a valid commercial 
                                                 
257 C-524/04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland 
Revenue [2007] ECR I-2107, para. 81. 
258 See Paragraph 3.4.2. 
259 The memorandum of the Swedish Ministry of Finance provides some examples of 
organisational restructures, which, in principle, are to be considered as being business 
motivated, see Paragraph 3.4.2. 
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consideration. However, the commerciality of that objective had its limits. 
An arrangement could not bee considered as commercial if it amounted to 
artificial transfers of profits. If, in the Cadbury Schweppes case, the Irish 
subsidiaries were incorporated solely to avoid UK taxation, they were to 
constitute wholly artificial arrangements, whereas they were not considered 
as such provided that they were otherwise conducting a commercial 
business of some sort. Hence, in order for an establishment or a transaction 
to be considered as wholly artificial, a total lack of business purposes is 
required. 
 
Based on the reasoning above, one could conclude that there is an obvious 
discrepancy between not allowing a deduction unless a transaction is 
principally business motivated and not allowing a deduction because a 
transaction is not business motivated at all. In its present wording, the 
Swedish rules on interest deduction limitation will affect transactions, which 
are business motivated, although not business motivated enough. 
Accordingly, since the second complementary rule, in the view of EU law, 
goes beyond what is necessary to attain the objective that they pursue, they 
are not proportional. However, this deficiency can be rectified by removing 
the word principally from the wording of the rule. 
 
Furthermore, I would like to draw attention to the conclusion made by the 
Court of Justice in Thin Cap Group Litigation that the re-characterisation of 
interest paid had to be limited to the proportion of that interest exceeding 
arm’s length commercial terms. This implies that adjustments to the taxable 
income, resulting from the application of the anti-abuse rules, should be 
limited to the extent that is attributable to the purely artificial arrangement. 
Such a requirement stands out as legitimate, since the application of the  
rules then puts the taxpayer in the same position as if he had carried out his 
business genuinely, i.e. if he had not relied on abusive measures.  
 
As regards the Thin Cap Group Litigation case, the paying company would 
be allowed to deduct interest to the same extent as if it had obtained the loan 
from a third party, whereas the rest would be taxed as profits paid as 
dividends. In its state of residence, the receiving company would be taxed 
on the part classified as interest on the same footing as the rest of its profits, 
whereas it would not be taxed on the part classified as dividends by 
application of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. Accordingly, the taxpayers 
are placed in the same position as if they had carried out their business 
genuinely from a group perspective as well. The same applies in the 
Cadbury Schweppes case, where the British parent would be taxed on the 
profit of the subsidiaries, but also credited the corporation tax paid in 
Ireland. However, this is not the case with the Swedish rules on interest 
deduction limitations, according to which interest deductions are denied as a 
whole. This puts the taxpayers, at least at a group level, in a position worse 
than if they would not have resorted to abusive measures. This is because 
the taxable income of the subsidiary will not be reduced if interest 
deductions are denied, whereas the receiving company will still be taxed on 
the corresponding interest income. 
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Moreover, I would like to comment the interpretation of the Swedish Tax 
Agency in respect of the second complementary rule requiring both the 
acquisition and the loan to be principally motivated. In an official 
standpoint, the Swedish Tax Agency has interpreted the rule as calling for 
businesslike reasons on behalf of the borrowing as well as the lending 
company.260 In my view, there are reasons to argue that an examination of 
the motives of the lending company is superfluous – or maybe even in 
conflict with the principle of proportionality. As concluded above, national 
anti-abuse rules may target wholly artificial arrangements only in order to 
be justified in the eyes of EU law. As long as the intentions of the 
borrowing company are found to be business motivated, even if only to a 
small extent, an interest deduction cannot be denied because the lending 
company has no such intentions, since the transaction would then not be 
wholly artificial. 
 
As a last remark, I would like to shortly point out some procedural 
implications of the rules and, in particular, difficulties in respect of the 
providing of evidence. As described in Paragraph 3.5, the burden of proof, 
in order for any of the two complementary rules to apply, falls on the 
taxpayer. From the an effectiveness of fiscal control perspective, there are 
legitimate reasons for placing the burden of proof on the taxpayers in 
question, as they are, obviously, the most fitted to acquire such evidence. It 
is only the taxpayers themselves who know what intentions that underlie the 
performance of certain transactions.  
 
However, the taxpayers cannot be subject to undue administrative 
constraints in producing the evidence. Even though it is emphasized in the 
preparatory work that the word principally is not referring to the level of 
proof, one may still fear that the assessment of whether a transaction is 
principally business-motivated or not may give rise to difficulties in respect 
of the providing of evidence. Not least, considering the many circumstances 
the Swedish Tax Agency regards as necessary in making such 
assessment.261 Furthermore, it can be questioned whether the level of 
commerciality of a certain transaction can be quantified at all, without 
risking that such assessments are in a too subjective and discretionary way. 
 
9.8 Conclusion 
The conclusion is that the Swedish rules regarding limitation of the 
deductibility of intra-group interest payments can be validly justified by the 
need to prevent abuse, since the rules aim to prevent a specific abusive 
measure and the means by which such abusive measures are thwarted are 
suitable for securing the attainment of that objective.  
 
                                                 
260 See Paragraph 3.4.2. 
261 Ibid. 
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However, the rules are not proportionate, as they go beyond what is 
necessary to attain the objective in question. In order for anti-avoidance 
rules to be proportional, they can only target wholly artificial arrangements 
entered into for tax purposes only. The second complementary rule 
prescribes that a transaction has to be principally business motivated, 
meaning that the transaction has to be business motivated to 75 percent. 
Considering this, the rules will affect business-motivated transactions, 
which do not meet the requirement of commerciality on 75 percent but still 
do not constitute wholly artificial arrangements. This deficiency could be 
rectified by removing the word principally from the wording of the rule. 
 
The conclusion above rests upon the reasoning of the Court of Justice in the 
cases Lankhorst-Horst, Cadbury Schweppes and Thin Cap Group Litigation. 
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